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The cases dealing with the authority of Congress to create courts other than
by use of its power under Art. III do not admit of easy synthesis.... I need not
decide whether these cases in fact sup'port a general proposition and three tidy
exceptions... or whether instead they are but landmarks on a judicial "dar-
kling plain" where ignorant armies have clashed by night ....
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Article III of the Constitution provides that the "judicial Power of
the United States" shall be vested in courts whose judges enjoy life
tenure and protection against reduction in salary.2 The literal lan-
guage of article III unambiguously requires that any exercise of fed-
eral judicial power be confined to courts whose judges possess the
guarantees of independence and impartiality granted by article 111.3
Despite article III's clear language the Supreme Court, on a number of
occasions, has upheld the creation of non-article III courts by Congress
1. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91
(1982)(Rebnquist, J., concurring).
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
3. Article III provides:
The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Id. art. HI, § 1. Justice White has remarked that
[a]ny reader could easily take this provision to mean that although Con-
gress was free to establish such lower courts as it saw fit, any court that
it did establish would be an "inferior" court exercising "judicial power of
the United States" and so must be manned by judges possessing both life
tenure and a guaranteed minimal income.




under the enumerated powers of article I of the Constitution.4 The
Supreme Court also has permitted Congress to create administrative
agencies under the enumerated powers of article I, even though the
functions of such agencies are quasi-judicial and they preside over dis-
putes arising under the laws or Constitution of the United States
which ordinarily would be within the federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion of article III courts.5
Despite a 150-year history of article I tribunals, in 1982 the
Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction granted to the United States
bankruptcy courts through the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was
unconstitutional.6 The Reform Act created non-article III bankruptcy
courts with pervasive jurisdiction to settle disputes related to proceed-
ings in bankruptcy. 7 However, a plurality of the Court in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.8 held such a
grant conflicted with the separation of powers mandated by article III.
Northern Pipeline's literal reading of article III 9 had the potential for
undermining the structure of the administrative state.10 However, the
Court has confined Northern Pipeline to its facts and has upheld the
constitutionality of non-article III tribunals."
In response to Northern Pipeline, Congress amended the Bank-
4. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. Examples of legislative courts are the territorial courts of
Guam, the Virgin Islands, the Mariana Islands and American Samoa, the military
courts, the courts of the District of Columbia, and the Tax Court.
5. See id. art. III, § 2.
6. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
7. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADruN. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2668-69 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1471(c)(repealed 1984)). Congress' bankruptcy power is contained in U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
8. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
9. Justice White remarked that the plurality's reading in Northern Pipeline was
"fine rhetoric," but that "analytically it serves only to put a distracting and super-
ficial gloss on a difficult question." Id. at 93 (White, J., dissenting). While most
commentators have agreed with Justice White, the notion that article III must be
read literally is not without its supporters. See, eg., Amar, A Neo-Federalist View
of Article IIL Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REV.
205 (1985); Amar, TakingArticle III Seriously: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 85
Nw. U.L. REV. 442, 445 (1991).
10. See Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipe-
line Decision, 1983 DuKE L.J. 197, 200 (the result of the plurality opinion "should
lead to the conclusion that much of the work of most federal administrative agen-
cies is unconstitutional").
11. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)(upholding
the power of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to hear counterclaims
based on state law); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 569
(1985)(characterizing Northern Pipeline as holding that Congress cannot give ar-
ticle I courts authority to finally determine state law contract actions where the
parties have not consented and where review is by traditional appeal). For a dis-
cussion of Northern Pipeline and subsequent cases, see Part III below.
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ruptcy Act in 1984.12 Although the Court has abandoned a literal
reading of article III, there are still valid jurisprudential and practical
concerns about the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA).13 Because the Court has
vacillated between a formalistic and functional approach to protecting
article III values, there is uncertainty among the lower federal courts
concerning the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, and therefore to-
day the bankruptcy courts function in a system whose validity is sub-
ject to the tension created by the Court's formalistic and functional
approaches to article III.14
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the Court's article III
jurisprudence and to suggest a constitutional analysis of the jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy courts granted by the 1984 amendments. Part
II describes the historical background of the present jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts. Part III presents a critical discussion of the
Supreme Court's recent cases. Part IV suggests that a consistent ana-
lytical framework for the application of article III depends primarily
on a clear theory of public rights (i.e., rights that can be adjudicated
without the participation of article III courts). Part V suggests an ap-
plication of the analysis to unresolved issues under BAFJA.
II. CRISIS IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS
Part II describes the history of BAFJA. First, this Part provides a
sketch of the prior regime under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Second,
this Part describes the goals of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
The invalidation of the Reform Act by Northern Pipeline is then dis-
cussed in considerable detail. Finally, the current jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts under BAFJA is described.
A. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
A proper understanding of the Bankruptcy Act is essential because
the Act controlled the law until quite recently and its effects continue.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 the district courts were vested with
original jurisdiction over all bankruptcy matters,1 5 but the district
12. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (98 Stat.) 333 (codified with amendments
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., & 28 U.S.C. (1988)).
13. See Ferriell, Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109 (1989); Comment, The Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984: An Unconstitutional Vesting of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 939 (1986).
14. See Gibson, Jury Trials and Core Proceedings: The Bankruptcy Judge's Uncer-
tain Authority, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 174 (1991)("the Court's analysis appears
to remain in a state of flux").
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (repealed 1978).
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court referred certain bankruptcy cases to officials who were appro-
priately called "referees."16 The cases so referred included all admin-
istrative proceedings.17 Controversies that were not administrative
proceedings: (i.e., those arising between the trustee and third parties
during administration of the estate) could be disposed of under the
referee's "summary jurisdiction." The term "summary jurisdiction"
was used to describe the expedited procedure available under the
bankruptcy" rules. Alternatively, a case could be tried under the "ple-
nary jurisdiction" exercised by the district court and state courts, act-
ing under their usual rules of procedure.
The bankruptcy courts' summary jurisdiction was equitable in na-
ture and their summary jurisdiction over property in their possession
was in rem. Although there was no personal jurisdiction,s summary
jurisdiction could be exercised in controversies not involving property
in their possession if the case had been commenced by the trustee in
bankruptcy with the consent of the defendant.19
If the property in dispute was not in the actual or constructive pos-
session of the bankruptcy court, or if the defendant had not consented
to summary jurisdiction, the action had to be heard by the district
court or by a state court under its plenary jurisdiction. The concept
that possession of the debtor's property granted in rem jurisdiction
was a creature of caselaw.20 Jurisdiction by consent, on the other
hand, was conferred by statute. Section 23b of the Act provided that
suits other than those within the summary jurisdiction of the court
must "be brought or prosecuted only in the courts where the bankrupt
might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings under [the
1898] Act had not been instituted, unless by consent of the defend-
ant."21 Further, the defendant in a suit prosecuted by the trustee was
16. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 34a, 30 Stat. 544, 554 (1898)(codified with
amendments at 11 U.S.C. § 62a (1976)(repealed 1978)), reprinted in 1 app. COL-
LER ON BANKRUPTCY 37 (15th ed. 1991)[hereinafter COLLIER 15th ed.].
17. Id. §§ 22a, 38,30 Stat. at 552, 554 (codified with amendments at 11 U.S.C. §§ 45a, 66
(1976)(repealed 1978)), reprinted in 1 app. COLLIER 15th ed., supm note 16, at 33,
41-42.
18. See 1 COLLIER 15th ed., supra note 16, % 3.01[1][b][iv], at 3-9.
19. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 23b, 30 Stat. 544, 552 (1898)(codified with
amendments at 11 U.S.C. § 46b (1976)(repealed 1978)), reprinted in 1 app. CoL-
LmR 15th ed., supra note 16, at 33.
20. See, e.g., Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 481 (1940)(property
in possession of debtor when petition filed); Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191,
194 (1926)(property in possession of third party who asserted a frivolous claim
that was merely colorable); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 13
(1924)(intangible property in possession of debtor); Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U.S.
102, 113 (1910)(property in the possession of third party who asserted no adverse
claim over it).
21. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 23b, 30 Stat. 544, 552 (1898)(codified with
amendments at 11 U.S.C. § 46b (1976)(repealed 1978)), reprinted in 1 app. COL-
LIER 15th ed., supra note 16, at 33.
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deemed to have consented to bankruptcy court jurisdiction merely by
filing a proof of claim. Section 2a(7) as amended in 1952, as well as
Rule 915, allowed the bankruptcy court summary jurisdiction if the
defendant had not raised the jurisdictional objection at the first oppor-
tunity.22 This was known as "jurisdiction by ambush."23
The referee system impeded the effective functioning of the courts
since, before any matter collateral to administration of the estate
could be resolved, it was necessary for the court to decide whether the
matter was within the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court.24 Because protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues reduced
the resources of estates to the detriment of creditors, Congress en-
acted the Reform Act of 1978 to avoid procedural battles by unifying
both plenary and summary jurisdiction in a single proceeding.2 5
B. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
Unification of jurisdiction over all proceedings in bankruptcy was
accomplished by granting the bankruptcy courts both in personam and
in rem jurisdiction.26 This unification had been suggested by a ten-
year study begun in 1968 by the Senate Judiciary Committee.27
22. Id. § 2a(7), 30 Stat. at 546 (codified with amendments at 11 U.S.C. § 46b (1976)(re-
pealed 1978)), reprinted in 1 app. COLLIER 15th ed., supra note 16, at 7; Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 915, 411 U.S. 995, 1098-99 (1973). The amendment to section 2a(7) was
enacted in response to the Supreme Court case of Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97
(1944), which held that a defendant is not deemed to have consented if he made
formal objection to the summary jurisdiction at any time before entry of a final
order in the proceeding. See H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952),
reprinted in 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy 23.08[4], at 545-46 (14th ed. 1976).
23. See Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Jus-
tice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1,
6 (1985).
24. See id.
25. This intention is clear from Representative Butler's remark that the new perva-
sive jurisdiction given the bankruptcy courts would eliminate "[w]asteful litiga-
tion over jurisdiction that occurs under the Bankruptcy Act." 124 CONG. REC.
32,419 (1978).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 445 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6400-01.
27. Hearings on S.J. Res. 100 Before the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The legislative history is
exhaustively discussed in Klee, The Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy
Law, 28 DE PAuL L. REv. 941, 942 (1979). The Judiciary Committee formed a
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in 1970. Act of July 24,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354,84 Stat. 468 (1970). The Commission filed its report with
Congress on July 30, 1973. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE BANKRupTcy LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATEs, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The report
also contained a draft of a proposed bankruptcy act.
Enactment of the law was delayed both by the Watergate Affair and by disa-
greement over what status the bankruptcy judges should be given. See H.R. 8200,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Klee, supra, at 953.
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In the House version of the Act passed on February 1, 1978,28 bank-
ruptcy judges were to be independent article III judges, and supervi-
sion of the administration of cases was entrusted to United States
trustees monitored by the Department of Justice.29 The idea motivat-
ing the House was that tenure and salary protections of article III
would attract a higher caliber of judges. The Senate amended the law
on September 7, 1978.30 Under the Senate's version the judges of the
bankruptcy courts would be adjuncts to the United States district
courts and the trustees were eliminated. On September 28, 1978, Con-
gressman Don Edwards proposed a compromise which provided for
nontenured bankruptcy judges to serve on independent bankruptcy
courts as adjuncts to the courts of appeals, with a pilot program of
United States trustees in eighteen judicial districts.31 In response to
perceived constitutional defects in this expanded jurisdiction, Con-
gress gave the courts jurisdiction dependent on that of the district
Courts. 32
As originally conceived, the bankruptcy courts were "adjuncts" to
the district courts.3 3 Adjunct status conferred on the bankruptcy
courts the full range of powers exercised by the district courts, includ-
ing the powers to conduct jury trials and to issue contempt citations.
By conferring this expanded jurisdiction, Congress attempted to abol-
ish the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction. In its
place Congress substituted the concepts of the title 11 bankruptcy case
and the civil proceedings which either arose under, arose in, or were
related to the title 11 case. This adjunct status was granted by 28
U.S.C. § 1471, which vested original jurisdiction over all proceedings in
bankruptcy in the district courts and allowed the bankruptcy court for
the district to exercise the district court's jurisdiction. The statute's
28. See 124 CONG. REc. 1783 (1978).
29. See id. at 1785.
30. See i. at 28,257.
31. Klee, supra note 27, at 954.
32. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADnm. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2668-69 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (re-
pealed 1984)), provided.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district
courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any act of Congress that confers exclusive ju-
risdiction on a court or courts, other than the district courts, the district
courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil pro-
ceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title
11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title
11 is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this
section on the district courts.
33. Id., 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2668-69 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 151(a)(repealed 1984)).
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grant of jurisdiction had three steps. First, section 1471(a) gave the
district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under
title 11. The title 11 case came into being when the petition was filed;
it was confined solely to matters concerning administration of the
estate.
Second, civil proceedings commenced by the trustee against third
parties were governed by section 1471(b). This section gave the dis-
trict courts original but not exclusive jurisdiction over "all civil pro-
ceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under
title 11." Since the district court's jurisdiction was not exclusive, it
could exercise jurisdiction concurrent with the state courts.
Finally, section 1471(c) vested in the bankruptcy courts the exer-
cise of all of the jurisdiction granted to the district courts by sections
1471(a) and (b). Section 1471 thus gave to the bankruptcy courts all of
the powers formerly exercised by the district courts- under the 1898
Act, including the power to conduct jury trials,34 and to issue con-
tempt citations.3 5 Since a bankruptcy court could preside over all civil
proceedings related to cases under title 11, the court could hear litiga-
tion based solely on the fact that the debtor had filed bankruptcy.
Such litigation would include enforcement of choses in action owned
by the debtor at the filing of the petition.
Although the Reform Act was signed into law on November 6,
1978,36 it was not to take effect until April 1, 1984.37 In the interim,
the judges of the old bankruptcy courts were to remain in office until
they had been replaced or reappointed.3 8 However, section 241(a) of
the law, which included 28 U.S.C. § 1471, was made to apply to the old
bankruptcy courts, even though Congress did not intend it to become
fully effective until 1984.39
C. Northern Pipeline
Three years after enactment of the Reform Act the Court in North-
ern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.40 invalidated
all of 28 U.S.C. § 1471. The case began inauspiciously when Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. (Northern Pipeline) sued Marathon Pipe
Line Co. (Marathon) in March of 1979 in the United States District
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1480(a)(repealed 1984).
35. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020, 461 U.S. 973, 1081 (1982)(amended 1987).
36. 14 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 2005 (Nov. 10, 1978).
37. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(b), 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat.) 2549, 2682.
38. Id. § 404(a), 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2683. See also
124 CONG. REc. 32,412 (1978)(remarks of Rep. Edwards).
39. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(b), 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2685.
40. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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Court for the Western District of Kentucky.41 The complaint con-
tained common law claims for breach of contract, breach of warranty,
misrepresentation, and duress.42
In 1980 Northern Pipeline filed for reorganization under chapter
11 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minne-
sota.43 As a proceeding related to its title 11 case Northern Pipeline
commenced an adversary proceeding against Marathon, alleging the
same cause of action it had alleged in district court. Marathon moved
to dismiss the adversary proceeding and challenged the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court to hear the related proceeding on the grounds
that the Bankruptcy Reform Act unconstitutionally conferred article
III jurisdiction.
The bankruptcy court denied Marathon's motion to dismiss44 and
Marathon appealed to the district court. The district court reversed,
holding that the Bankruptcy Reform Act's delegation of judicial
power to non-article III judges was unconstitutional.45 Both Northern
Pipeline and the United States as intervenor filed direct appeals from
the district court's decision with the Supreme Court.
In a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court af-
firmed the district court, holding that the Reform Act attempted to
confer jurisdiction in violation of the separation of powers mandated
by the Constitution.46 Only three justices concurred in Justice Bren-
nan's opinion.47 The plurality opinion had two bases: (1) the bank-
ruptcy courts did not fall within any of the traditional legislative court
exceptions to article III48 and (2) the Reform Act vested more power
in the bankruptcy courts than could be sustained under Congress'
power to create adjuncts to article III courts.49
41. Brief for Appellant at 3, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)(No. 81-150).
42. Joint Appendix at 6, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982)(No. 81-150). Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). Id.
43. Brief for Appellant at 4, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)(No. 81-150).
44. Marathon Pipe Line Co. v. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 6 Bankr. 928 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1980).
45. Marathon Pipe Line Co. v. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 12 Bankr. 946 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1981).
46. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
47. Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens concurred in the plurality opinion.
Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion in which he and Justice O'Connor
concurred in the judgment only. Chief Justice Burger dissented and filed a sepa-
rate opinion to emphasize that the judgment was narrowly confined to the facts
in the case. Justice White also filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice Powell.
48. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-66
(1982).
49. Id at 87.
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The plurality opinion noted that the Court has recognized only
three exceptions to article III: the territorial courts,50 the courts-mar-
tial,1 and the legislative courts created by Congress to adjudicate pub-
lic rights.52 Clearly bankruptcy courts are not territorial courts or
courts-martial. Arguably, they are legislative courts, and this excep-
tion commanded the greatest attention in the plurality opinion.
The Court's analysis of the legislative court exception depended on
the public rights doctrine. This is the doctrine that Congress may as-
sign public rights to article I legislative courts since public rights need
not be adjudicated in article III courts.
The public rights doctrine had been first articulated by Justice
Curtis in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.53 As
found there, the doctrine concerned the government's waiver of sover-
eign immunity. Murray's Lessee concerned the validity of a sale by a
United States marshall under a warrant issued by a Treasury Depart-
ment official. The sale was challenged on fifth amendment due pro-
cess grounds and on the grounds that the sale was a violation of article
III's requirement of adjudication by an article III court. Justice Curtis
stated that the judicial remedy for those claiming unlawful conduct by
the executive had been granted by Congress through waiver of the
government's sovereign immunity.54 In granting judicial remedy
under the public rights doctrine Congress may do so "to such extent,
and with such restrictions, as may be thought fit."55
Since the doctrine as found in Murray's Lessee was based on the
government's consent to be sued, Justice Brennan declared that a nec-
essary condition for finding the existence of a public right is the in-
volvement of the government as a party.5 6 Disputes in bankruptcy do
not involve public rights under this criterion since most collateral pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy arise between private parties.
Further, bankruptcy courts do not adjudicate only public rights
under Congress' enumerated article I powers. Although the bank-
ruptcy courts are created pursuant to an article I power,57 they are
50. Id. at 64 (citing American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)).
51. Id. at 66 (citing Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857)).
52. Id. at 67 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272, 284 (1855)).
53. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Justice Brennan concluded that "a matter of public rights must at a minimum
arise 'between the government and others.'" Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)(quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,
279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). However, he did not say that it was a sufficient condi-
tion: "[Tihe presence of the United States as a proper party to the proceeding is
... not [a] sufficient means of distinguishing 'private rights' from 'public rights.'
Id. at 69 n.23.
57. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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also fora for many proceedings based solely on state law. Article III of
the Constitution reserves adjudication of common law proceedings to
article III courts.5 8 The Court was therefore justified in holding that
private rights based on state common law, such as the contract dispute
in Northern Pipeline, must be adjudicated in article III courts.5 9 Jus-
tice Brennan declined to say whether the statutory rights assigned by
Congress for adjudication in the bankruptcy courts were public rights,
but merely stated that "the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations,
which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power,... may well be a
public right."60
Although Justice Brennan failed to find that the bankruptcy
courts were legitimate article I courts, he conceded that they might be
"adjuncts" to article III courts, in which case judicial power would in
reality be exercised by article III courts.6 1 Justice Brennan applied an
analysis based on Crowell v. Benson 62 to determine whether bank-
ruptcy courts were adjuncts to the district courts. Justice Brennan's
application of Crowell will be further criticized below.63
Crowell involved a challenge to the Longshoremen's and Habor
Workers' Compensation Act under which the United States Employ-
ees' Compensation Commission had the power to determine compen-
sation claims. Crowell, Deputy Commissioner of the agency, had
made an award against Benson and in favor of Knudsen, his alleged
employee. Benson brought suit in federal district court and the dis-
trict court conducted de novo review of all the facts on the theory that
article III required such rehearing. The Supreme Court affirmed but
found that the statute required an article III court to rehear only "ju-
risdictional" and "constitutional" facts.6 4 The Court held that admin-
istrative findings of nonconstitutional and nonjurisdictional fact
become conclusive on the courts if the findings are without error of
law.65 The Crowell Court held that Congress may assign factfinding to
article I tribunals so long as the "essential attributes" of judicial power
58. Id. art. III, § 2.
59. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-72
(1982).
60. Id. at 71.
61. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
62. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
63. See infra section IH.A. It should be noted here that Crowell does not require a
legislative court to be an adjunct; it only requires that when private rights are
adjudicated in an article I court, the "essential attributes" of judicial power be
retained in an article III court.
64. Jurisdictional facts are those upon which the jurisdiction of an agency depends,
such as whether there was an employment relation. Constitutional facts are
those facts necessary to enforce fundamental constitutional rights. See Ng Fung
Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1922).
65. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932).
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are retained in an article III court.66
Justice Brennan observed that the administrative agency in Crow-
ell was limited to making factual findings that were enforceable only
in a district court after review of the law and the record. Justice Bren-
nan also noted that the Court in United States v. Raddatz67 had up-
held the determination of constitutional facts made by federal
magistrates under the 1978 Federal Magistrates Act. From these cases
he derived two principles: (1) Congress may assign a federal right to
an adjunct for adjudication; (2) notwithstanding such assignment, the
essential attributes of judicial power must be retained by an article III
court.6
8
The question in Northern Pipeline accordingly was whether the
Act "retained 'the essential attributes of the judicial power' in Art. III
tribunals."69 Justice Brennan, first, found that Crowell and Raddatz
would not support assigning to adjuncts rights not created by Con-
gress, such as the state law contract dispute in Northern Pipeline.
Tellingly, however, Justice Brennan conceded that the cases never
distinguished between rights created by Congress and other rights.70
Justice Brennan asserted that "such a distinction underlies in part
Crowell's and Raddatz' recognition of a critical difference between
rights created by federal statute and rights recognized by the Constitu-
tion."7 1 He further asserted that the distinction was required by the
separation-of-powers doctrine. Therefore, he concluded that Con-
gress' assignment of a right it had not created to an article I court
would be an encroachment on the article III courts.
Second, Justice Brennan noted that the Act did not retain the es-
sential attributes of judicial power in an article III court. He con-
trasted the bankruptcy courts with the agency in Crowell. The
Employees' Compensation Commission in Crowell could not compen-
sate victims, but only made factual determinations, which could be en-
forced by the district courts only after review under a "weight of the
evidence" standard.72 By contrast, the bankruptcy courts not only ex-
ercised subject matter jurisdiction that encompassed all civil proceed-
66. Id. at 51-55.
67. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
68. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80-81
(1982).
69. Id. at 77 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
70. See infra section III.A.
71. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83 (1982).
72. Id. at 85. This aspect of the Court's holding is not supported by Crowell. One
commentator has remarked that "[n]either in Northern Pipeline nor in Schor did
the Court cite any authority for its conclusion that the Crowell standard provides
more thorough review of fact-finding." Young, Public Rights and the Federal Ju-
dicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFFALO L.
REv. 765, 861 (1986).
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ings arising under title 11 or arising in cases related to cases under
title 11, but also all jurisdiction of the district courts. Furthermore,
the bankruptcy courts could issue any orders issuable by the district
courts; the judgments of the bankruptcy courts were subject only to a
deferential clearly erroneous standard of review; and the bankruptcy
courts could issue final judgments that were binding even absent an
appeal. For these reasons, Justice Brennan concluded that the Re-
form Act unconstitutionally encroached on the powers reserved to the
article III courts.
Two bases of the Brennan opinion were adopted by the concur-
rence and therefore represent the holding of the case:73 (1) Northern
Pipeline's state law claim was not a public right that may be adjudi-
cated by a non-article III court; and (2) the bankruptcy court was not
an adjunct of an article III court merely because it was subject to tradi-
tional appellate review by an article III court.74 Although the Court
confined its holding to find that the state law claim was not a public
right that could be adjudicated by a non-article III bankruptcy court,
the plurality opinion invalidated all of the jurisdiction granted by 28
U.S.C. § 1471 on the theory that section 1471(b), giving the courts au-
thority to adjudicate related proceedings, was nonseverable.75
The Court stayed its judgment until October 4, 1982, to give Con-
gress time to remedy the defects in its legislation. By October Con-
gress had done nothing and the stay was extended until December 23,
1982.76 Further extension of the stay was denied on December 24,
1982.77
D. The Emergency Rule
Since Congress' inaction in the face of the Northern Pipeline deci-
sion would have left the dockets of the district courts filled with bank-
ruptcy cases, the Judicial Conference 78 promulgated an "Emergency
Rule" which the district courts universally adopted as a local rule.79
The Emergency Rule referred "[a]ll cases under Title 11 and all civil
proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to cases
73. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976).
74. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91 (1982).
75. Id. at 87 n.40.
76. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982).
77. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 1094 (1982).
78. The Judicial Conference is created by 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). At the time of the
Northern Pipeline decision the Conference consisted of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, the chief judge of each federal judicial circuit, a district judge
from each circuit and the chief judges of the Courts of Claims and of the Courts
of Customs and Patent Appeals. See Countryman, supra note 23, at 8 n.45.




under Title 11" to the bankruptcy courts.8 0 The reference of the dis-
trict court could be withdrawn upon motion of the district court or by
motion of a party.8 '
The Emergency Rule was based on the assumption that Northern
Pipeline had invalidated only 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c), while leaving sub-
sections 1471(a) and (b) intact.8 2 Thus the Emergency Rule preserved
the jurisdictional scheme of the 1978 Act except that the bankruptcy
courts could no longer enter final judgments in civil proceedings re-
lated to the bankruptcy case. The Rule singled out related proceed-
ings on the theory that these were not part of "the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations" which, in the words of Justice Brennan, "is
at the core of the federal bankruptcy power."8 3 Thus the Rule defined
related proceedings as "those civil proceedings that, in the absence of a
petition in bankruptcy, could have been brought in a district court or a
state court." Related proceedings were defined to include, but were
not limited to, "claims brought by the estate against parties who [had]
not filed claims against the estate."' 4 The Rule provided that the
bankruptcy judges could not enter judgments or dispositive orders in
related proceedings, but were required to submit findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and a proposed order to the district judge. However,
the bankruptcy judge could enter final judgments in related proceed-
ings if the parties consented.8 5
The Rule also specifically listed certain "nonrelated" proceedings,
such as those that frequently arise as collateral proceedings during a
bankruptcy case.86 The bankruptcy judges could perform "all acts and
80. Id. § (c)(1), reprinted in 1 COLLIER 15th ed., supra note 16, 3.01[1][b][vi], at 3-16.
81. Id. § (c)(2), reprinted in 1 COLLIER 15th ed., supra note 16, 1 3.01[1][b][vi], at 3-16.
82. See Countryman, supra note 23, at 21.
83. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982).
84. Emergency Rule § (d)(3)(A), reprinted in 1 COLLIER 15th ed., supra note 16, 1
3.01[1][b][vi], at 3-17.
85. Id. § (d)(3)(B), reprinted in 1 CoLLuR 15th ed., supra note 16, 1 3.01[1][b][vi], at 3-
17.
86. Id. § (d)(3)(A), reprinted in 1 COLLIER 15th ed., supra note 16, 3.01[1][b][vi], at 3-
17. Significantly, these proceedings included the following actions which were
later termed "core proceedings" under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) of BAFJA:
[C]ontested and uncontested matters concerning the administration of
the estate; allowance of and objection to claims against the estate; coun-
terclaims by the estate in whatever amount against persons filing claims
against the estate; orders in respect to obtaining credit; orders to turn
over property of the estate; proceedings in respect to lifting of the auto-
matic stay; proceedings to set aside preferences and fraudulent convey-
ances; proceedings to determine the dischargeability of particular debts;
proceedings to object to the discharge; proceedings in respect to the con-
firmation of plans; orders approving the sale of property where not aris-
ing from proceedings resulting from claims brought by the estate against
parties who have not filed claims against the estate; and similar matters.
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duties necessary for the handling" of a nonrelated proceeding.8 7
However, the Rule stripped the bankruptcy courts of authority
given by the 1978 Act to hold jury trials.88 The judges were also pro-
hibited from granting injunctions to court proceedings, punishing for
criminal contempt not committed in their presence, and could not con-
duct appeals of bankruptcy cases.8 9 In all these respects, the Emer-
gency Rule provided a framework for congressional action.
E. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
Congress considered a number of responses to Northern Pipeline,
including a return to referees and article III status. After extended
hearings over whether article III status should be conferred on the
judges of the bankruptcy courts,90 Congress sent a bill to the President
for signature on June 29, 1984.91 Under the bill, the judges of the
bankruptcy courts would remain article I judges without life tenure.
In order to comply with the constraints of Northern Pipeline Con-
gress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1471 to give the district courts the power to
abstain from deciding cases arising under state law.92 Under the 1984
amendments the bankruptcy courts are adjuncts to the district courts,
although more precisely they are "units" of the district courts.9 3 The
87. Emergency Rule § (d)(1), reprinted in 1 COLIER 15th ed., supra note 16,
3.01[1][b][vi], at 3-16.
88. Id. § (d)(1)(D), reprinted in 1 COLLER 15th ed., supra note 16, 1 3.01[1][b][vi], at 3-
17.
89. Id. § (d)(1)(A), (B), (C), reprinted in 1 COLLIER 15th ed., supra note 16,
3.01[l][b][vi], at 3-16.
90. The record of the hearings may be found in Bankruptcy Court Act of 1983: Hear-
ings Before Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of House Judici-
ary Committee on H. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) and in Hearings Before
Subcommittee on Courts of Senate Judiciary Committee on Northern Pipeline
Co. Decision, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
91. 130 CONG. REc. 20,080,20,206,20,234 (1984). The entire bill can be found in Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (98 Stat.) 333 (codified in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., & 28 U.S.C. (1988)).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district
courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive ju-
risdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district
courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil pro-
ceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title
11.
(c)(1) Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest
of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for
State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising
under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.
93. Id. § 151.
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district courts use a local rule to refer cases to the bankruptcy courts,
as they did under the Emergency Rule.9 4 BAFJA differs from the
1978 Act inasmuch as the referral under BAFJA is not automatic and
may be withdrawn.95
The statute also provides that certain proceedings are "core," de-
riving its terminology from the language of Northern Pipeline. Sub-
section 157(b)(1) gives the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to enter final
orders in core proceedings. Subsection 157(b)(2) proceeds to list fif-
teen categories of core proceedings, closely following the list of nonre-
lated proceedings from the Emergency Rule. Subsection 157(b)(3)
provides that a bankruptcy court is to make the determination
whether a proceeding is core either upon its own motion or upon the
motion of a party. It also provides that the determination is not to be
made solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by state
law.
If a bankruptcy court determines that the noncore proceeding is
related, it may send the related proceeding to the district court with
instructions that the district court abstain under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c).
This section allows the district court to exercise either mandatory9 6 or
permissive abstention.9 7 Abstention is mandatory in noncore, related
proceedings based on state law. A decision to abstain under the
mandatory abstention clause "is not reviewable by appeal or other-
wise."9 8 Alternatively, the bankruptcy court may hear a noncore, re-
lated proceeding, and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law to the district court for de novo review by the district court
under section 157(c)(1). Finally, the bankruptcy court may hear a case
and enter a final judgment with consent of the parties under section
157(c)(2). 99
Congress left many issues unresolved in BAFJA. These issues in-
94. Id. § 157(a) provides that "[e]ach district court may provide that any or all cases
under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the
district."
95. Id. § 157(d).
96. Id. § 1334(c)(2) provides that "in a proceeding based upon a State law claim ...
related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case
under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in
a court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district
court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding."
97. Id. § 1334(c)(1).
98. Id. § 1334(c)(2).
99. Proper exercise of jurisdiction under section 1334 relies on distinguishing be-
tween cases (1) arising in, (2) arising under and (3) related to a bankruptcy case.
For a discussion of the courts' difficulty in construing these distinctions, see Note,
Jurisdictional Uncertainties Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 75 KY.
L.J. 129 (1986-87); Note, Jurisdiction Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of
1984: Summing Up the Factors, 22 TULSA L.J. 167 (1986). See also Gibson, Re-
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clude the scope of core proceedings, related proceedings and proceed-
ings arising under title 11. They also include the question of how a
party may consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction in noncore, related pro-
ceedings. Essentially, Congress in BAFJA left it to the courts to find a
solution to the constitutional infirmities of the Reform Act of 1978.
The following Parts of the Comment elaborate a theory to guide this
process.
III. ARTICLE III JURISPRUDENCE
This Part provides a critical discussion of the recent Supreme
Court cases on article III, and discusses the Court's recent application
of the public rights doctrine. A threshold analysis demonstrates that
the Court has failed to provide any consistency in its formulation of
the public rights doctrine and that although the cases on article III
provide no firm rules, they do provide an analytical framework ade-
quate to sustain BAFJA.
A. Northern Pipeline's Formalism
The key to the plurality's formalism in Northern Pipeline is to un-
derstand that Justice Brennan's analysis of the public rights doctrine
moval of Claims Related to Bankruptcy Cases: What is a "Claim or Cause of
Action"?, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1986).
According to one authority "arising in" "may act as the residual category of
civil proceedings, including those which do not arise under title 11, and those
which are not related to title 11 cases." 1 COLLIER 15th ed., supra note 16,
3.01[c][v], at 3-29.
It is clear from Northern Pipeline that "'related proceedings' are those that
(1) involve causes of action owned by the debtor that become property of the
estate under section 541, and (2) concern suits between third parties which in one
way or another affect the administration of the title 11 case." Id. 3.01[c][iv], at 3-
26. BAFJA, unlike the Emergency Rule, never defines "related proceedings."
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (the Emergency Rule's definition of
related proceedings).
"Arising under" means a cause of action "which either is created by title 11 or
which is concerned with what are called 'matters concerning the administration
of the estate' in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2) (A), in the sense that no adverse third party
is involved." 1 CoLLIER 15th ed., supra note 16, 3.01[c][iii], at 3-24. See also
Norton & Lieb, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amend-
ments, 1985 ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPrCY LAW 53, 58-59 (W. Norton ed.
1985) (analyzing the distinction between cases arising in and related cases on the
basis of whether a case may constitutionally be heard by a bankruptcy judge).
In Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit devised
a widely adopted test under which a civil proceeding is related "if the outcome
could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options or freedom of action (either pos-
itively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and ad-
ministration of the bankruptcy estate." Id. at 994. See also In re Fietz, 852 F.2d
455 (9th Cir. 1988)(adopting Pacor rationale); National City Bank v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 802 F.2d 990, 994 (8th Cir. 1986)(adopting Pacor rationale).
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is based on a mistaken reading of Crowell v. Benson.lOO There are
three further grounds for criticizing the plurality opinion.
First, the text of the Constitution contains no support for the Crow-
ell version of the public rights doctrine. The doctrine as first articu-
lated in Murray's Lessee apparently referred to one of two things: (1)
the doctrine that those disputes between a private individual and the
government which Congress could dispose of were established by Eng-
lish institutions existing contemporaneously with the framing of the
Constitution, or (2) the doctrine that Congress can itself decide any
civil controversy between a private individual and the government or
can assign such decision to a delegate.lO' Crowell is the first case to
articulate the public rights doctrine in terms of a distinction between
congressionally created rights and those vested by other law.102 How-
ever, the Crowell public rights doctrine has no support in article III of
the Constitution or in Murray's Lessee. It is therefore difficult to
fathom the historical basis of Justice Brennan's purportedly literal in-
terpretation of article III.
Second, Northern Pipeline's restriction of the article I courts to the
three historical paradigms of territorial courts, courts-martial, and the
legislative courts is artificial. To justify such restriction Justice Bren-
nan asserted that if Congress were allowed to create tribunals under
every one of the enumerated powers in article I, there would be no
limiting principle to prevent Congress from invoking the necessary
and proper clause and supplanting the independent article III courts
with a system of specialized legislative courts.103 However, Justice
Brennan failed to provide any theory to explain how Congress has cre-
ated the territorial courts or the courts-martial; his theory of Con-
gress' power to create legislative courts is based on the doctrine of
public rights in Crowell. As has been stated, the Crowell doctrine has
no basis in the Constitution.
Finally, Justice Brennan conceded that Crowell makes no distinc-
tion between congressionally created rights and state law rights-04
Nevertheless, the decisive factor in Northern Pipeline was that the
bankruptcy court was adjudicating a state law contract claim. If sepa-
ration-of-powers concerns were motivating the policy of Crowell, these
concerns seem less important in the context of bankruptcy. Bank-
ruptcy is a specialized area of law in which political meddling by Con-
gress is unlikely to occur. Further, the state law cause of action
ordinarily involved in proceedings incidental to bankruptcy adminis-
100. See supra text accompanying notes 61-72.
101. See Young, supra note 72, at 793-94.
102. See id. at 794.
103. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 72-73
(1982).
104. Id. at 83.
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tration is not the type of action that would lead to political encroach-
ment.' 05 It is more likely that politics would motivate Congress to
withdraw a congressionally created federal cause of action from the
article III courts.
The later cases make clear that Justice Brennan's theory is unac-
ceptable. The later cases have accepted a balancing approach similar
to that suggested by Justice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline. Jus-
tice White concluded that the Court's cases on article III lacked any
articulable rule that could support the plurality's exceptions. 0 6 His
alternative to Justice Brennan's formalism is to balance Congress' in-
terests in creating administrative tribunals against the values of arti-
cle 111.107 However, Justice White's ad hoc balancing approach is also
unacceptable because Congress can always create legislative interests
to outweigh article 111.108 The next section will show that the Court
has not in fact adopted the "legal realism" suggested by Justice
White's approach,109 but rather has chosen to employ a functional ap-
proach to article III.
B. Since Northern Pipeline: Thomas and Schor-A Functional Approach
The later Supreme Court decisions to interpret article III laid to
rest concerns that the Court would invalidate all administrative agen-
cies. These cases are marked by a functional approach to article III.
An important element in this new approach is its flexible conception
of the public rights doctrine. The public rights doctrine is extensively
discussed in the following sections.
1. Thomas
The first case to consider the public rights doctrine after Northern
Pipeline was Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.1l0
Thomas concerned the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA).111 FIFRA requires that manufacturers of pesticides
submit research data to the Environmental Protection Agency on the
pesticides' health, safety and environmental effects as a precondition
of registration and provides that follow-on registrants can use the ma-
105. Id. at 98 (White, J., dissenting).
106. In fact, he concluded his examination of the cases with the remark that the
"Court has implicitly concluded [in these cases] that the legislative interest in
creating an adjudicative institution of temporary duration outweighed the values
furthered by a strict adherence to Art. IM." Id. at 114.
107. Id. at 115.
108. See Redish, supra note 10, at 223-24.
109. As is suggested by Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article III, 101 HARv. L. REv. 915, 929 (1988).
110. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
111. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 to 136y (1988).
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terial submitted by former applicants if they compensate the former
applicants for use of the documentation. Such data have trade secret
status under state law until made public. The Act provides for binding
arbitration if the parties cannot reach agreement on adequate compen-
sation. An arbitrator's decision is subject to judicial review only for
fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.
In Thomas Union Carbide and thirteen other large chemical firms
challenged FIFRA on the grounds that it substituted an inadequate
federal right for trade secret rights under state law and forced them to
submit to arbitration of the rights by an arbitrator whose decision was
unreviewable by a tenured judge.1' 2
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor, first, narrowly con-
fined Northern Pipeline to its facts by stating that "[t]he Court's hold-
ing in that case establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-
Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and
issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state
law."113
Second, the Thomas Court rejected Union Carbide's contention
that the right implicated in FIFRA was a matter of state law or that it
was a private right that must be adjudicated in an article III court. In
interpreting the private-public distinction, Justice O'Connor empha-
sized that the brightline reading of the distinction in Northern Pipe-
line had failed to command a majority of votes.11 4 Justice O'Connor
quoted Chief Justice Hughes' remark in the Crowell opinion that the
public rights inquiry must not be confined to "mere matters of form"
but also must include inquiry into "the substance of what is re-
quired." 5 She added that "practical attention to substance rather
than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform applica-
tion of Article III."116 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor eschewed appli-
cation of the formal categories of Northern Pipeline to FIFRA.
Looking to the substance of FIFRA, Justice O'Connor employed a
two-step test that examined (1) the nature of the right, and (2) the
concerns motivating the legislature. She noted that the right created
by FIFRA was not purely private in nature, but had the characteristics
of a public right since use of the the data by the follow-on registrant
112. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 575-77 (1985).
113. Id. at 584.
114. Id. at 585-86:
This theory that the public rights/private rights dichotomy... provides a
bright-line test for determining the requirements of Article III did not
command a majority of the Court in Northern Pipeline.... Nor did a
majority of the Court endorse the implication of the private right/public
right dichotomy that Article III has no force simply because a dispute is
between the government and an individual.
115. Id. at 586 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53 (1932)).
116. Id. at 587.
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was an integral part of a congressionally created scheme to protect the
public health. 17 Next she stated that by allocating the costs of valua-
tion of the data to private parties, Congress intended to free the
agency from this task; therefore, Congress' intention was not to dimin-
ish the likelihood of impartial decisionmaking which article III
protects.
Justice O'Connor's analysis of the public rights doctrine is in strik-
ing contrast with Northern Pipeline. On the issue of state law causes
of action, she noted that since the workers' compensation act at issue
in Crowell displaced a traditional cause of action, it would be a matter
reserved to the article III courts under the Northern Pipeline ap-
proach."18 She also rejected Justice Brennan's notion that the govern-
ment's presence as a party would be determinative."19 The result in
Thomas was that private rights under state trade secret law were not
implicated in FIFRA; Congress had created a legislative scheme that
did not displace state law rights, but created public rights. The Court
concluded that its holding was "limited to the proposition that Con-
gress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitu-
tional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly 'private' right
that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a
matter appropriate for agency resolution."i 2 0
2. Schor
The public rights doctrine underwent further refinement in Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.'21 Schor concerned a
regulation promulgated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC) under authority granted by the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA).122 The regulation provided for adjudication of counter-
claims "aris[ing] out of the transaction or occurrence or series of trans-
actions or occurrences set forth in the complaint" in a reparations
action brought before the CFTC.23 Schor filed a claim against Con-
tiCommodity Services, Inc. (Conti), a commodity broker, before the
CFTC, alleging that Schor's account with Conti contained a debit bal-
ance because of Conti's violation of federal law.124 Conti filed a diver-
sity action in district court to recover the debit balance from Schor
before Conti received notice of Schor's action. Conti voluntarily with-
drew this action from district court and the CFTC decided both
117. Id. at 589.
118. Id. at 587.
119. Id.
120. Id at 593-94.
121. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
122. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 26 (1988).
123. 17 C.F.R. § 12.23(b)(2)(1991).
124. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 837 (1986).
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Schor's claim under federal law and Conti's state law counterclaim in
Conti's favor. Schor challenged the authority of the CFTC to hear the
counterclaim only after the adverse judgment.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the CFTC had no authority to hear Conti's state law counterclaim.
The court of appeals adopted a reading of the CEA that allowed the
court to avoid the constitutional problem, holding the CEA authorized
the CFTC to hear only those counterclaims arising from violations of
the CEA or agency regulations.
The Court overturned this decision. The Court's opinion repre-
sented a departure from Northern Pipeline in that it identified two
interests protected by article III. Rather than emphasizing only the
separation-of-powers values of Northern Pipeline, the Court in Schor
stressed that the framers intended article III primarily to protect the
litigant's personal right to an independent and impartial adjudication
by a federal court.' 5 Of secondary importance to the framers were
the structural interests of protecting the federal judiciary from en-
croachments by the other branches. The Court emphasized that the
personal right to adjudication by an article III court is subject to
waiver, as is the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the seventh amend-
ment.12 6 In this case the Court found that Schor had waived his right
to an article III court by consenting to CFTC jurisdiction. 2 7
The second step in the Court's analysis was to inquire whether the
regulation encroached on the structural interest protected by article
III. In Schor the Court made clear that the fact that a counterclaim is
a private right based on state law does not per se require that it must
be tried in an article III court. The Court likened the inquiry into the
state law character of a claim to the distinction between private and
public rights which Thomas had characterized as "pragmatic." 125
Schor made clear that the inquiry into the state law character of the
claim is an initial inquiry that recognizes there is a greater "risk that
Congress may improperly have encroached on the federal judiciary...
when Congress 'withdraw[s] from judicial cognizance any matter
125. Id. at 848. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 379 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)(A.
Hamilton):
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Consti-
tution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors
which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunc-
tures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which,
though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliber-
ate reflection, have a tendency in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor
party in the community.
See also United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980).
126. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986).
127. Id. at 849.
128. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985).
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which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in
equity, or admiralty' and which therefore has traditionally been tried
in Article III courts."129
After a court has determined that a claim is based on state law, the
inquiry must proceed to decide whether there is "the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other."130 The
factors used to determine whether there is an encroachment should be
the extent to which the "essential attributes of judicial power" are reserved to
Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III fo-
rum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in
Article III courts, the origin and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and
the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article
111.131
In upholding the CEA, the Court in Schor compared the CFTC to
the bankruptcy courts which it had invalidated in Northern Pipeline.
This analysis is significant because it indicates the direction the Court
may take in examining the jurisdictional provisions of BAFJA.132
3. Result of Thomas and Schor
Thomas and Schor present a significantly revised version of the
public rights doctrine and, correspondingly, a pragmatic revision of ar-
ticle III values. Harking back to Justice White's dissent in Northern
Pipeline, the Court in these cases recognized that article III's values
were not inconsistent with Congress' interest in creating non-article
III tribunals. Congress has a legitimate interest in administrative effi-
ciency and in preserving the article III courts from inundation by ad-
ministrative actions.
Moreover, when the primary article III value is conceived of as the
parties' interest in an independent and impartial adjudication, there is
no inconsistency between article III and adjudication of state law
claims by a legislative court. The conception of the public rights doc-
trine in these cases is pragmatic and allows agency determination of
state law claims that would be based on private rights under the
Northern Pipeline analysis. Part of the analysis is whether Congress
has impaired the tenure and salary protections of article III by with-
drawing the matter from the judiciary and giving it to nontenured bu-
reaucrats. However, it is assumed in Schor and Thomas that Congress
may integrate a private right within an administrative scheme so that
the private right becomes public in nature. It is clear that the salary
129. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854 (1986)(quoting
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,284
(1856)).
130. Id. at 850 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)(per curiam)).
131. Id. at 851 (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 84 (1982)(plurality opinion)).
132. See infra subsection IV.B.3.a.
1991]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
and tenure protections of article III are not required in the adjudica-
tion of public rights by article I tribunals; however, the Court in these
cases did not indicate to what extent the "essential attributes of judi-
cial power" must be retained by an article III court in such
adjudications.133
C. Granfinanciera-Questioning the Validity of the Core Proceeding
In Granfinanciera v. Nordbergl3 4 the Court returned to the consti-
tutional limits of bankruptcy jurisdiction. In Granfinanciera the
Court held that Congress cannot change the nature of a state common
law right by denominating it a core proceeding in bankruptcy.
Granflinanciera concerned proceedings for fraudulent conveyances
which are among those Congress enumerated as core in BAFJA.135
In Granfinanciera the trustee for the debtor, Chase & Sanborn,
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1) and (2), and 550(a)(1), attempted to
avoid allegedly fraudulent transfers by Chase & Sanborn's corporate
predecessor to the Columbian bank Granfinanciera. The defendant,
Granfinanciera, contended that it was entitled to a jury trial of the
fraudulent conveyance action under the seventh amendment. The
Court agreed and found that Congress could not deprive a litigant of
the right to a jury trial by reclassifying a preexisting common law
cause of action and granting exclusive jurisdiction over it to a non-
article III tribunal.136
Although the case has much to say about the seventh amendment
right to a jury trial in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, its impli-
cations for BAFJA are equally important.137 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Brennan, returns to a formalistic analysis reminis-
cent of Northern Pipeline. The opinion analyzes the seventh amend-
ment requirement under a two-part analysis based on Crowell v.
Benson.138 First, Justice Brennan applied a seventh amendment in-
133. For example, Thomas explicitly leaves the question open: "In this case Congress
has provided for review of arbitrators' decisions to ensure against 'fraud, misrep-
resentation, or other misconduct.' The Court therefore need not reach the diffi-
cult question whether Congress is always free to cut off all judicial review of
decisions respecting such exercises of Art. I authority." Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 601 (1985).
134. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H)(1988).
136. "[P]urely taxonomic change cannot alter our Seventh Amendment analysis. Con-
gress cannot eliminate a party's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial merely
by relabeling the cause of action to which it attaches and placing exclusive juris-
diction in an administrative agency or a specialized court of equity."
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61 (1989).
137. See Schwartzberg, The Retreat From Pervasive Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy
Court, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (1990).
138. The Granfinanciera analysis requires that the court look to whether the statu-
tory cause of action is a public right which Congress may assign and has assigned
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quiry to determine whether the case was of a kind triable at law or in
equity at the time the seventh amendment was ratified.39 After Jus-
tice Brennan determined that the fraudulent conveyance action was
legal in nature, he applied the article III public rights test to deter-
mine whether Congress may assign the legal right to a non-article III
tribunal that does not use a jury as a factfinder.140
Because the Court in Granfinanciera again relied on Crowell, two
concepts recur in its application of the public rights doctrine: (1) that
of the congressionally created scheme of public rights; (2) the idea that
a private right may be triable in a non-article III tribunal if it is neces-
sary to a congressionally created scheme. The Court held that the
fraudulent conveyance action was noncore by finding that the defend-
to a tribunal which lacks "the essential attributes of the judicial power." See
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 n.4 (1989). If the statutory cause of
action is legal in nature, then the answer to the seventh amendment inquiry must
be the same as the answer to the article III inquiry. This is so because, if the
cause of action must be assigned to an article I court, then the seventh amend-
ment requires a jury trial. However, if it is a public right which Congress may
assign to a non-article III tribunal, then afortiori the seventh amendment would
present "no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury
factfinder." Id. at 53-54.
139. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987).
140. The Court in Granfinanciera employed the public rights analysis of Thomas. As
stated by Justice Brennan, where the statutory cause of action does not concern
governmental waiver of sovereign immunity, the crucial question
is whether "Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to
its constitutional powers under Article I, [has] creat[ed] a seemingly 'pri-
vate' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as
to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involve-
ment by the Article MI judiciary."
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989)(quoting Thomas v. Union Car-
bide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985)). Reliance on the public and
private right distinction from Thomas, rather than the functional approach of
Schor, appears to be a return to the categorial formalism of Northern Pipeline.
See Gibson, supra note 14, at 170-71.
The Court declined to state whether the congressionally created scheme of
restructuring debtor-creditor relations is a public right, noting that that thesis
had received "substantial scholarly criticism." Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33, 56 n.11 (1989). However, the Court did find that the statutory right cre-
ated by the fraudulent conveyance provision of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) was noncore.
The Court stated that
[t]here can be little doubt that fraudulent conveyance actions by bank-
ruptcy trustees-suits which .... "constitute no part of the proceedings
in bankruptcy but concern controversies arising out of it"-are quintes-
sentially suits at common law that more nearly resemble state-law con-
tract claims brought by a bankrupt corporation to augment the
bankruptcy estate than they do creditors' hierarchically ordered claims
to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res.... They therefore appear
matters of private rather than public right.




ant had not consented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.141
The Court concluded that if the creditor had consented by filing a
claim, the fraudulent conveyance action would become core.
Justice Brennan stated two bases in support of this conclusion:
Because petitioners here... have not filed claims against the estate, respon-
dent's fraudulent conveyance action does not arise "as part of the process of
allowance and disallowance of claims." Nor is that action integral to the re-
structuring of debtor-creditor relations. Congress therefore cannot divest pe-
titioners of their Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury.1 4 2
One basis stated in the passage quoted is the traditional concept of
the actual or constructive possession of the bankruptcy court under
the 1898 Act (i.e., the property had not entered the process of allow-
ance and disallowance of claims). The second basis stated is that the
action itself was not integral to the congressional scheme. Although
two bases are stated, the second, functional basis would be sufficient to
support the conclusion.
The first basis, that is, the concept of consent to the court's equita-
ble jurisdiction, can be no more than a means for finding that the pri-
vate right was triable in a non-article III tribunal that functions
without a jury as factfinder. The equitable jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court is instrumental in the seventh amendment inquiry but
cannot by itself answer the public rights question. Therefore, the is-
sue of the core status of a proceeding must still be resolved on the
second basis stated in the quoted passage, namely, whether the pro-
ceeding affects the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations.
Although the Granfinanciera Court confined its result narrowly
to the seventh amendment issue, the combined result of
Granfinanciera and Schor suggests that the concept of consent has
further constitutional implications. Both cases suggest that consent of
a party may bring a private right into a congressional scheme where it
141. The Court declined to overrule Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1965), in which it
held that voidable preferences are an essential part of the court's power to allow
or disallow claims. The Granfrinanciera Court distinguished Katchen by noting
that Katchen was based on the equitable concept of the actual and constructive
possession of the court. In Katchen there was no right to a jury trial in the prefer-
ence action because the defendant had filed claims against the estate, thereby
consenting to the summary jurisdiction of the referee to disallow them. If the
defendant had not submitted a claim, then he would have been entitled to a jury
trial in a plenary proceeding in district court. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33, 57-58 (1989). It can be assumed that Katchen will maintain an important
place post-Granfinanciera. See Langencamp v. Culp, 111 S. Ct. 330 (1990)(per
curiam). Indeed, one may go so far as to say that implicit in the Granfinanciera
holding is an assimilation of core and summary jurisdiction under the 1898 Act.
See Stober v. Steelinter USA (In re Industrial Supply Corp.), 108 Bankr. 799, 801
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989). But cf infra note 187.
142. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 58-59 (1989)(quoting Katchen v. Landy,
382 U.S. 323, 336 (1966)).
[Vol. 70:555
BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
may be adjudicated by an article I tribunal.143
The next Part suggests that Granfinanciera's formalistic use of the
private-public distinction'44 might be interpreted pragmatically in
light of Schor. In the words of Schor, the fraudulent conveyance ac-
tion in Granfinanciera was not "a necessary incident of [the] congres-
sional scheme," but merely a peripheral state law action. If the
defendant had consented by filing a claim, the private right would
have become a necessary incident of the federal scheme of restructur-
ing debtor-creditor relations. The Court in Granfinanciera resisted
this interpretation of its precedents because under federal bankruptcy
law in most instances the creditor, who is often a third-party defend-
ant, cannot be said to consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction.145 In fact,
the creditor generally has no alternative to bankruptcy court since
prepetition state court actions are automatically stayed pending ad-
ministration of the bankruptcy estate.146
In summary, the Court's cases on article III do not represent a set-
tled body of law, but create the possibility of case-by-case adjudication
based on a self-conscious pragmatism. These cases do not even indi-
cate the extent to which the essential attributes of judicial power must
be retained in an article III court. Nevertheless, the broad principles
articulated in these decisions are supported by a theory of public
rights based on article III values, such as a party's personal interest in
the independent and impartial functioning of the federal system and
the structural interest of the separation of powers. The next Part ar-
gues that there is consistency in this approach which may suggest a
coherent vision of public rights.47
IV. A PROPOSED THEORY OF PUBLIC RIGHTS
This Part presents a critical evaluation of recent suggestions for
shaping article III jurisprudence and then presents an analytical
framework for viewing the jurisdictional provisions of BAFJA. The
first section criticizes recent theories of article III. These theories do
not give proper weight to both the structural and personal interests
embraced by article III. This Part argues that an adequate theory
must take into consideration the initial characterization of what con-
143. This is not to suggest that the concepts of waiver from Sclwr and consent from
Granfinanciera are the same. The Court clearly distinguished the rationales of
the two cases. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 59 n.14 (1989). The
two concepts are functionally similar, however, inasmuch as the Court appears to
use both in the analysis of public rights. The concept of consent is discussed fur-
ther in subsection IV.B.2 below.
144. See supra note 140.
145. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 59 n.14 (1989).
146. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1) (1988) (automatic stay of prepetition proceedings).
147. Even the coherence of the Court's position has been questioned. See Fallon,
supra note 109, at 932 n.114.
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stitutes a public right. Examination of the Court's recent cases in the
preceding Part demonstrated that the Court's concept of public rights
is pragmatic and that such rights cannot be examined apart from the
nature of the tribunal adjudicating them. Recent theories of article III
are based on preserving either the personal interests of the litigants or
the structural interests of separation of powers. A pragmatic theory of
public rights can recognize both interests. This Part suggests a theory
of the public rights doctrine that may be used to develop an analytical
framework for selected constitutional issues in the use of state law in
bankruptcy.
A. A Critique of Recent Article III Jurisprudence
1. The Appellate Review Theory
Commentators troubled by the Court's pragmatism in Schor have
suggested that the values of article III would be better protected if all
decisions of article III tribunals were subject to appellate review.1 48
This suggestion is motivated by legitimate concerns that the Court's
abandonment of article III literalism has left no rule capable of consis-
tent application.
In the most comprehensive treatment of the theory Professor Fal-
lon has suggested that appellate review should not only be a sufficient
condition for satisfying article III (i.e., a tribunal's jurisdiction is con-
stitutional if its decisions are subject to appellate review), but that it
also should be a necessary and sufficient condition (i.e., a tribunal's
jurisdiction is constitutional if and only if its decisions are subject to
appellate review). 14 9 While the theory that appellate review is a suffi-
148. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 109; Redish, supra note 10, at 226-28; Comment, A
Literal Interpretation of Article III Ignores 150 Years of Article I Court History:
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Oil Pipeline [sic] Co., 19 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 207 (1983); Saphire & Solimine, Shoring Up Article III: Legislative
Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U.L. REV. 85 (1988).
149. See Fallon, supra note 109, at 918: "[A]dequately searching appellate review of
the judgments of legislative courts and administrative agencies is both necessary
and sufficient to satisfy the requirements of article III." See also Redish, supra
note 10, at 226-29; Saphire & Solimine, supra note 148, at 139 ("the mandate of
article III is only satisfied when Congress, in creating a non-article III tribunal,
makes available article III review of that tribunal's factual and legal determina-
tions"). This Comment uses the term "necessary and sufficient condition" in the
sense of the following definition:
A necessary condition is a circumstance in whose absence a given event
could not occur or a given thing could not exist. A sufficient condition is
a circumstance such that whenever it exists a given event occurs or a
given thing exists. A necessary and sufficient condition for the occur-
rence of a given event or the existence of a given thing is therefore a
circumstance in whose absence the event could not occur or the thing
could not exist and which is also such that whenever it exists the event
occurs or the thing exists.
Brody, A Glossary of Logical Terms, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 60 (P.
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cient condition has some historical support in Crowell,15o the theory
that it should be a necessary and sufficient condition does not. Fal-
lon's theory is subject to the obvious objection that it contravenes both
the Court's holding in Northern Pipeline'5 1 and federal statutes that
remove the decisions of administrative agencies from review.'5 2
Under this theory most administrative decisions of legal questions
would lack finality. 5 3 Administrative bodies are efficient to the ex-
tent they possess both rulemaking and enforcement authority.154
Conditioning their power of enforcement on appellate review would
defeat one of their purposes.
Other objections to Fallon's theory may be made. Besides
whatever review article III requires, there are also independent due
process restraints on the government's administration of public rights.
Public rights under the modern view involve "disputes arising from
the Federal Government's administration of its laws or programs."155
They therefore represent a grant to the individual which the govern-
ment may retract. However, within the limits of due process, the gov-
ernment has sovereign authority for determining the forum and the
Edwards ed. 1967). It is clear that Fallon supposes appellate review to be a neces-
sary and sufficient condition, while Saphire and Solimine suppose it to be at least
necessary.
150. See Fallon, supra note 109, at 946-47.
151. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 n.39
(1982)(plurality opinion). See also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932).
152. See, ag., Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) & (2)(1988)(provid-
ing that agency decisions are unreviewable when a statute expressly excludes re-
view and when a decision is "committed to agency discretion by law"). Cf. Fallon,
supra note 109, at 979-80.
153. It should be noted that Fallon's theory requires differing levels of reviewability
for constitutional issues, issues of law, and issues of fact. Fallon, supra note 109,
at 974-91. However, Fallon states that Northern Pipeline was wrongly decided
because the scheme allowed appellate review, while Thomas was wrongly decided
because it allowed only review for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. Id. at
991. The weakness of Fallon's theory is that it does not take into account that the
bankruptcy courts were adjudicating private rights based on state common law
and exercising all powers of the district courts. The arbitrator in Thomas was
enforcing public rights based on federal statutory law. A basic premise of Fal-
lon's theory is that rights based on state law have fewer implications for article
EI. See id. at 939. However, there is no basis in the Constitution or in the caselaw
for distinguishing levels of finality on the basis that state law provides the rule of
decision.
154. Efficiency as a justification of administrative agencies is dismissed by R. POSNER,
EcONoMIc ANALYsIs OF LAW § 23.1, at 571-72 (1986). Judge Posner suggests that
the true justification for the dual functioning of administrative agencies is that
Congress is seeking to reduce nullification of legislation by judicial nonenforce-
ment. Transfer of the factfinding to the agency removes the risk of judicial non-
enforcement. Id. § 23.1, at 572.
155. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 596 & n.1 (1984)(Bren-
nan, J., concurring in judgment).
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procedures governing administration of its programs.156 The concep-
tion of public rights articulated by Professor Fallon is correct insofar
as it gives the government absolute discretion to determine who shall
be the party, when the case arises and what the remedy shall be.157
Necessarily, however, if the government possesses this sovereign
power over the forum, the addition of appellate review will protect the
fairness 5 8 of the proceeding only to the extent fairness is secured by
the legislation creating the public right.159
Furthermore, there are separation-of-powers objections to Fallon's
theory. Since the paradigmatic case of public rights depends on a gov-
ernmental grant, creation of a public right is not a usurpation of judi-
cial power. Instead, it is the creation of a new right that could only
exist by congressional action and enforcement by a department of the
executive. Judicial decisionmaking in this regard would be interfer-
ence with the legislative or executive branches.160 Granting judicial
oversight through appellate review in every case decided by an admin-
istrative agency would lead to encroachment by the judicial branch on
156. Recent Supreme Court cases require the state to terminate a benefit under the
due process clause. See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773
(1980)(nursing home). Fallon supports his argument with entitlement cases such
as Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), and Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). See Fallon, supra note 109, at 964 & n.267. As
Fallon notes, however, in cases such as Loudermill and Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court has taken a positivist approach to entitlements. See
Fallon, supra note 109, at 964 n.269. Under the Court's positivist approach the
government's legislation creates the property interest and determines procedures
for its termination.
157. Fallon's theory assumes that the paradigmatic case of public rights is the coercive
payment of custom's duties; here the government can engage in coercive activity
without prior judicial authorization. See Fallon, supra note 109, at 954. The gov-
ernment can then delegate the interpretation of the laws to an administrative
agency, authorize the officials to coerce payment and then use sovereign immu-
nity to deny redress. The government has absolute discretion to determine
against whom the suit can be brought-the government or the official-to deter-
mine when a case emerges, and to limit the extent to which an individual has a
remedy in damages. Id. at 962-63.
158. Fallon argues that fairness is the primary value protected by article III. See id at
941-42. Fallon uses the term to describe the independence and impartiality guar-
anteed by life tenure. The term will be used throughout the remainder of this
Comment in that sense, although independence and impartiality will also be re-
ferred to as the "personal interests" of article III.
159. See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 796 (1980); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
160. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680-81 (1988) (stating that the judicial branch
may not be assigned "tasks that are more appropriately accomplished by [other]
branches"). But cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)(holding consti-
tutional the Sentencing Commission created by the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. 98-473, §§ 211-226, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADiMIN. NEws (98 Stat.)
1987 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (1988)), because Congress may
confer rulemaking authority on the judicial branch).
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the executive 1 61
An implication of the doctrine of separation-of-powers is that in-
dependent review of legislative court decisions is necessary only if
Congress has committed private rights to an article I tribunal for adju-
dication. If a right derives from a congressional grant, the procedural
aspects of administration of the program must be reviewed under the
due process clause, but not the individual cases.1 62
Even if there is review to ensure that administrative procedure
complies with due process, appellate review of cases deciding private
rights will only preserve the article III value of fairness. It will not
preserve the structural interests of article III any more than does ap-
pellate review under current practice. In the case of private rights,
such as those in Thomas, appellate review will not even preserve fair-
ness unless as a threshold matter the private rights adjudicated in an
article I tribunal are properly characterized as public rights. There-
fore, the fundamental inquiry should be whether a private right is ca-
pable of being characterized as public.
2. A Functional Approach to Separation-of-Powers Doctrine
Professor Strauss has recently proposed a functional approach to
the separation-of-powers doctrine.163 He suggests that rather than
looking at whether an article I adjudicative body is exercising the
power of the executive or judicial branch, the inquiry should focus on
the quality of the relationships the article I body bears to the several
branches. Strauss' view recognizes that administrative agencies may
exercise the functions of all three branches of government: they have
authority to shape policy through the decisionmaking power of the ex-
ecutive; legislative authority to adopt rules that resemble statutes; and
judicial authority to determine the rights of private parties. The anal-
ysis must, therefore, examine the relationships of article I bodies
"with each of the three named heads of government, to see whether
those relationships undermine the intended distribution of authority
161. See Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Ques-
tions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 515-16 (1987)(sug-
gesting that the Court is reluctant to extend its own power to the detriment of
the other branches); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372 (1953). Ju-
dicial encroachment on the executive was the problem in the early stages of the
New Deal legislation. See Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Econ-
omy, 1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. REv. 645 (1946); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After
the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987).
162. See Note, Congressional Preclusion of Judicial Review of Federal Benefit Dis-
bursement Reasserting Separation of Powers, 97 HARV. L. REV. 778, 792-93
(1984) (stating that courts deny review of particular cases but grant review of ad-
ministrative procedures and regulations).
163. See Strauss, supra note 161; Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government Sepa-
ration of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 CoLuM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
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among those three."'164 In other words, do the relationships the body
bears to the branches create a functioning of powers that would tend
to concentrate power in one branch, thereby depriving the others of
their authority?
Strauss' theory is sound and appears to explain current Supreme
Court practice; it is, however, limited to explaining how the structural
interests of article III are preserved. Preventing encroachment on the
functions of the judiciary will preserve the fairness of the process only
to the extent that power is retained by the courts against Congress.
Strauss' theory only explains how the balance of power is maintained
between the three branches of government. It does not purport to ex-
plain the relations between the administrative agencies and the article
III courts.
Thus, on Strauss' theory, the balance of power may be maintained
at one level because Congress creates public rights that have not tradi-
tionally been heard in the courts. But the administrative process em-
ployed by Congress may leave enforcement only in the hands of an
agency directly under the executive and deny the courts the power of
enforcement.165 Agencies that are dependent on the legislature for
funding are more apt to political influence that denies parties the per-
sonal interests of independent and impartial adjudication.
A theory of public rights should address both the fairness issue and
the separation-of-powers issue. Additionally, any theory must recog-
nize that due process requires that independent, appellate review be
made available. The Supreme Court has not stated whether appellate
review is a sufficient condition for the validity of a congressional
scheme that contains private rights as an integral part.166 Under the
Schor inquiry review is guaranteed if private rights are adjudicated by
an adjunct that preserves the essential attributes of judicial power in
an article III court. The Schor inquiry does not imply that appellate
review is a sufficient condition, however; more is required of a theory
to explain the concept of consent present in the later cases. Appellate
review would be merely symbolic unless a party consents to an admin-
istrative procedure that substitutes only review for an individual's
rights under state law.
This section has conceded that access to an article III court is nec-
164. Strauss, supra note 161, at 493-94 (emphasis in original).
165. See R. PosNER, supra note 154, § 23.1, at 572.
166. The Court in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592-93
(1985)(footnote omitted), stated:
We need not identify the extent to which due process may require re-
view of determinations by the arbitrator because the parties stipulated
below to abandon any due process claims.... For purposes of our analy-
sis, it is sufficient to note that FIFRA does provide for limited Article III




essary when a private right is implicated in an administrative scheme
and that review of administrative proceedings for constitutional error
is required by due process. 6 7 It has also argued that appellate review
is never a necessary and sufficient condition for preservation of the
personal and structural values of article III. The Court has held that
appellate review is not a sufficient condition. It remains to explain
why it is not also a necessary condition. The following section elabo-
rates a theory of public rights to explain why appellate review is not a
necessary and sufficient condition for satisfying article III when public
rights are adjudicated in an administrative proceeding.
B. A Theory of Public Rights
As suggested in the preceding section, an adequate theory of public
rights must explain how the public rights doctrine protects both the
personal and structural interests of article III. This section presents a
theory of public rights that recognizes both values by proceeding with
a hypothetical deductive method: it first hypothesizes a normative
theory of public rights and then proceeds to test this hypothesis
against the caselaw. To the extent the hypothesis preserves the intu-
itions of the caselaw, it is an adequate theory.68
167. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932). The bifurcation of the fifth amend-
ment due process and article III inquiries traces back at least to Murray's Lessee
where the validity of pure executive action was first upheld. See Murray's Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277-80 (1855). But
cf. Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural
Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 463 (1986)(arguing that the two inquiries should
not be bifurcated and that article m judicial independence is a necessary condi-
tion of due process).
168. The discussion sets forth a normative theory of the public rights doctrine (ie.,
one that matches those intuitions that are central to democratic society), rather
than a descriptive theory. The discussion assumes that the theory should be mod-
ified by principles derived from the caselaw. In this regard the method is that of
"reflective equilibrium" in which theory and moral intuitions are compared with
one another with neither given a preferred value in the production of the final
"construct." See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971). See also Fallon, A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1189 (1987).
To define adequacy by virtue of a theory's power to "explain" the caselaw is
not to say that the intuitions found in the caselaw are correct a priori. Indeed,
several ethical theorists claim that, since at least the mid-nineteenth century,
western society has possessed no agreed norms to form the basis of common intu-
itions. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed.
1984); R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLDARITY (1989). But cf Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS
223, 225 (1985)(since the Reformation and War of Religions the goal of western
European society has been accommodation of divergent world-views). Neverthe-
less, the institutional constraint of precedent must be balanced against a theoreti-
cal construct. See R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 247-48 (1986)(legal constructivism
is not inconsistent with precedent).
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1. The Theoretical Construct
The following theory states normative principles derived from the
cases. Although constitutional law evolves incrementally, a theory
purporting to organize the insights of the caselaw into a small number
of generalizations will serve as an aid to analysis. The following dis-
cussion states three interrelated principles concerning the public
rights doctrine and states what conclusions should be consistently de-
rived from them. It then examines whether current law is consistent
with those principles.169
a. Efficiency
One of the most general principles of the public rights doctrine is
that administrative agencies and legislative courts are designed to fur-
ther the efficiency of the process of adjudication. There is nothing
that is inherently administrative about administrative bodies, just as
there is nothing inherently judicial about judicial bodies.170 Cases that
may be tried before one may be tried before the other. However, adju-
dication of a case may be expedited by entrusting it to a tribunal which
specializes in a certain area of law. Moreover, entrusting adjudication
of a limited class of claims to specialized tribunals frees the article III
courts for adjudicating other cases. Specialization also has the value of
reducing the transactional costs of the private parties.' 71
A further principle of efficiency is that the right adjudicated need
not be of congressional making to warrant specialized treatment. In
other words, the right may be private. However, to warrant special-
169. The Court's self-professed pragmatism would seem to argue against an attempt to
create a coherent theory in this area. See R. DwoRKIN, supra note 168, at 159-60
(criticizing pragmatism as a philosophy of adjudication content to exist without
theory-building). However, even pragmatism requires that one posit principles
from which conclusions will consistently follow. Pragmatism is simply another
form of practical reasoning. See Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 332, 350 & n.67 (1986).
170. "There is no difference in principle between the work that Congress may assign
to an Art. I court and that which the Constitution assigns to Art. III courts."
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 113
(1982)(White, J., dissenting).
171. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)(legislative purpose was "to furnish a
prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of
questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by
an administrative agency specially assigned to that task"), cited with approval in
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986). Adminis-
trative efficiency in the context of bankruptcy is discussed in Jackson, Translat-
ing Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 84-86
(1985). Jackson justifies administrative efficiency on the basis of the creditors'
bargain theory. See T.H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRuPrcY LAW
(1986). The creditors' bargain theory is criticized in Rasmussen, Bankruptcy and
the Administrative State, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1567 (1991).
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ized treatment a private right must be such that complete relief in the
administrative hearing cannot be granted absent jurisdiction over the
private right.172 Otherwise, article HI requires adjudication in an arti-
cle III court.173 If the private right becomes involved in a scheme of
public rights created by Congress, it assumes the character of a public
right since administrative efficiency would be lost if the private right
were adjudicated outside the congressionally created scheme. 74
These principles do not in themselves explain why efficiency is a
justification for assignment of a private right to a non-article III tribu-
nal. That justification must be based on the notion that complete de-
termination of the right can be had in a tribunal of limited
jurisdiction. This justification is implicit in Crowell's conception of
public rights as a grant from the government circumscribed by a trun-
cated proceeding of the government's choosing.175 This traditional no-
tion of the limited character of the public right is consistent with basic
notions of fairness: the individual loses nothing in fairness on account
of the truncated proceeding, but gains much in terms of efficient adju-
dication. Therefore, an implication of the caselaw is that one will
choose adjudication before a legislative tribunal when one would gain
more in terms of efficiency from that choice than one would lose in
terms of fairness.
172. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986)(must
show "evidence of valid and specific legislative necessities"); Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985)(Congress may create pri-
vate right "closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme").
173. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)(quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 944 (1983)): "'Ihe fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, conve-
nient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government."'
174. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,589 (1985); Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 47 (1932). See also Far East Conference v. United States,
342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952)(stating the doctrine of primary jurisdiction):
[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of
judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agen-
cies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be
passed over. This is so even though the facts after they have been ap-
praised by specialized competence serve as a premise for legal conse-
quences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and consistency in the
regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and
the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exer-
cised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circum-
stances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than
courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by
more flexible procedure.
Accord Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 654 (1973).
175. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932)(quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279




A second, related principle follows from the first: to warrant spe-
cialized treatment, rights must be fairly adjudicable in article I tribu-
nals (i.e., such adjudication must not deprive the parties of an
impartial hearing). In Crowell the Court attempted to preserve fair-
ness by distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of law.
In Crowell the United States Employees' Compensation Commission
adjudicated private rights implicated in a congressional scheme. The
Court's holding that the article III courts were bound by the Commis-
sion's factual findings but not by its legal findings preserved impartial-
ity by requiring that the scheme retain the essential attributes of
judicial power in an article III court.176
One may infer from Crowell that fairness is preserved if the con-
gressional scheme of public rights provides some recourse to an article
III court. In Northern Pipeline Justice Brennan incorrectly inferred
from Crowell that Congress may either create an adjunct to an article
III court or create an article I court that adjudicates public rights.177
Later cases rejected this categorial formalism and inferred from Crow-
ell the open-ended principle that article I tribunals may adjudicate pri-
vate rights if the essential attributes of judicial power are retained in
an article III court.178
A further principle that may be drawn from the cases is that adju-
dication in an article I tribunal is fair if it is voluntarily chosen.179 If
the scheme of public rights preserves an alternative to the article I
tribunal, the choice is voluntary. Fairness and separation of powers
are related since preservation of the article III court will satisfy both
interests.
176. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).
177. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,77 n.29
(1982). "The use of administrative agencies as adjuncts was first upheld in Crow-
ell .... Crowell involved the adjudication of congressionally created rights." Id.
at 78. However, Chief Justice Hughes in Crowell stated that "[t]he present case
... is one of private right, that is of the liability of one individual under the law as
defined." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932). Moreover, Crowell never
called the agency an "adjunct." But cf. Strauss, supra note 161, at 509.
178. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)(in cases involving private rights
"there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of
judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by
judges"). See also Strauss, supra note 161, at 509-10.
179. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 849 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 591 (1985): "The dan-
ger of Congress or the Executive encroaching on the Article III judicial powers is
at a minimum when no unwilling defendant is subjected to judicial enforcement




A third principle is that Congress' power to create public rights
must be legitimate. The cases are clear that Congress may not create a
public right adjudicable in an article I tribunal simply because the
right is related to Congress' article I power to legislate. 8 0
However, the Court has stated that there are special circumstances
where the requirements of article III must "give way to accommodate
plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to spe-
cialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive
treatment."'' The Court requires that the area of law be specialized
and that it be within Congress' article I powers. If both conditions are
satisfied, the independence of the judiciary required by article III will
be maintained.
Schor makes clear that the legitimacy of congressional action may
be determined by a pragmatic inquiry into the intent of Congress or by
an examination of the area of expertise. 8 2 If the area of expertise is
one peculiarly related to a statutory scheme, such as tariff regulation,
then it is not an encroachment to entrust some portion of the adjudica-
tory function to an article I tribunal. Further, if Congress' intent is
simply to create a means of determining public rights that cannot be
completely adjudicated without the consideration of private rights, the
adjudication of private rights does not constitute an encroachment on
the functions of the judicial branch. Schor also makes clear that the
Court's pragmatic inquiry is functional.
In summary, the theory elaborated in the preceding section has
two premises: First, public rights are rights of congressional creation
limited to a particular regulatory scheme such that they may be fully
and fairly adjudicated in a truncated proceeding. Intervention of the
article III courts in the legal and factual determination of such rights
would add nothing in terms of fairness and would in fact impede
efficiency.
Second, private rights may be treated as public rights if one of two
conditions is fulfilled: (a) if public rights cannot be fully determined
without determination of private rights or (b) if the scheme of public
rights preserves the essential attributes of judicial power in an article
III court. Preservation of the article III courts in the last alternative
180. See, e.g., Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,52 (1989); Thomas v. Union Car-
bide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 73-76 (1982); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupa-
tional Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 n.7 (1977); United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13-15 (1955).
181. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407-08 (1973), cited with approval in
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985).
182. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845-55 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590 (1985).
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ensures that the scheme does not violate the doctrine of separation of
powers; access to the article III courts also preserves the personal in-
terests of article III.
This theory explains why appellate review is not a necessary and
sufficient condition for satisfying article III. It is not sufficient be-
cause Congress may not assign common law claims to article I courts
merely on the condition that appellate review is preserved; more is
required of a scheme, namely that assignment of the common law
claim be necessary for effectuation of the scheme. Further, appellate
review is not a necessary condition because one may forgo appellate
review of an article I adjudication if the conditions underlying such
adjudication are fair (i.e., if it preserves judicial independence and im-
partiality). The following discussion tests this theory against the
caselaw.
2. The Personal Interests of Article III-Jurisdiction by Consent
The previous section hypothesized that one might choose adjudica-
tion in a non-article III court if the proceeding were fair and if an al-
ternative forum were available. The concept of consent to a non-
article III proceeding played a role in Schor and Granfinanciera, but
the cases do not present a consistent rule. In Schor the Court stated
that the right to adjudication by an article III tribunal was a personal
right that could be waived by the litigant.18 3 Schor made clear that
article III's protection extends primarily to the personal interests of
independence and impartiality rather than to the structural interests
represented by separation of powers.1 8 4 This suggests that parties
may consent to jurisdiction by the bankruptcy courts even in proceed-
ings based on state law.
However, in Granfinanciera the Court distinguished Schor. Schor
was based
on the ground that Congress did not require investors to avail themselves of
the remedial scheme over which the Commission presided. The investors
could have pursued their claims, albeit less expeditiously, in federal court. By
electing to use the speedier, alternative procedures Congress had created, the
Court said, the investors waived their right to have the state law counter-
claims against them adjudicated by an Article III court. Parallel reasoning is
unavailable in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, because creditors lack
an alternative forum to the bankruptcy court in which to pursue their
claims.1 8
5
The passage indicates that consent is not per se an element in a proper
theory of public rights. The quoted passage presumably refers to the
automatic stay to nonbankruptcy proceedings, although no explicit
183. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1986).
184. Id. at 848.
185. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 59 n.14 (1989)(citation omitted).
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reference to the automatic stay is made.186 The passage therefore
states that creditors in bankruptcy cannot be said to waive their right
to a jury trial because they have already been denied that right by the
automatic stay to state court proceedings.
By contrast, in Schor the personal right to a trial in an article III
court could be waived. The right to a trial in an article III court was
preserved in Schor; therefore there was no need for an inquiry into the
sufficiency of consent alone. The passage from Granfinanciera sug-
gests that consent to an article I tribunal is adequate only when re-
course to an article III court is preserved.18 7 The passage is not
inconsistent with the theory discussed in the preceding sections since
that theory did not state that consent alone was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction but also required that the proceeding consented to be fair
(i.e., preserve judicial impartiality and independence).
It will be argued below188 that consent to article I adjudication im-
plies that the state law right is a public right. The cases suggest that
consent to adjudication of private rights in an article I tribunal is al-
ways conditioned on the preservation of access to an article III court.
However, this requirement may be rephrased by saying that one can-
not consent to jurisdiction of an article I tribunal unless the rights
adjudicated are determined to be public rights.1s 9 Public rights, in
186. Filing of the petition in bankruptcy by the debtor acts as an "automatic stay" of
all prepetition state and federal court proceedings by creditors against the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1988). The creditors must petition for relief from the auto-
matic stay to pursue their rights in court.
187. The consent found by the Court in Granfinanciera appears analogous to the con-
cept of consent under the Act of 1898, whereby a creditor could consent to the
equitable, summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy referee. See notes 18-23 and
accompanying text above for a discussion of consent under the 1898 Act.
A return to the old distinction as a solution to the constitutional infirmities of
BAFJA has been suggested with reservations by Marrion, Core Proceedings and
the "New" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 35 DE PAUL L. REv. 675, 695
(1986)("Although extension of the consent theory may provide a solution to the
article III problem, the sounder approach is to determine whether the Act of 1984
has retained 'the essential attributes' of judicial power in an article III court,
notwithstanding core treatment for all compulsory counterclaims.").
The Court's use of the concept of consent in Granfinanciera cannot be treated
as a return to the concept of consent to the equitable, summary jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court under old bankruptcy practice. The Reform Act of 1978 did
away with the distinction between plenary and summary jurisdiction. The con-
trolling concept in Granfinanciera is the public right, not the summary, equita-
ble jurisdiction of the courts, since, even if the right entitles the party to a jury
trial, Congress may assign the right to an article I tribunal if it is a public right.
Moreover, since Congress has done away with summary jurisdiction, see H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMN. NEws 5963, 6009-11, there is no bar to jury trials in bankruptcy
court independent of the public rights doctrine. See infra subsection V.B.3.
188; See infra subsection IV.B.3.c.
189. See supra subsection IV.B.I.c.
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turn, only exist in a regulatory scheme within Congress' legitimate
powers. Simply put, a party can waive article III trial of private rights
only if the party receives public rights in return. The "fairness" of the
exchange, however, depends on the legitimacy of the scheme of public
rights (ie., it must not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine).
3. The Structural Interests of Article III
The preceding section essentially concluded with the observation
that the parties cannot cure the structural infirmity of an article I
court's exercise of article III judicial power by consent.190 Schor sug-
gested a three-part inquiry to determine whether an article I tribunal
is exercising article III power. No one element is to be determina-
tive;19 1 however, this does not -entail increased uncertainty, since the
elements must be applied in tandem. This subsection shows that the
elements are consistent with a coherent theory of public rights since
the theory protects the fairness of the adjudication through a separa-
tion-of-powers inquiry. The later cases differ from Northern Pipeline
in the respect that they apply the separation-of-powers inquiry in a
functional rather than a formalistic manner.
a. The Essential Attributes of Judicial Power
Schor lists five instances in which the jurisdictional provisions of
the Reform Act of 1978 departed from the agency model suggested by
Crowell v. Benson.192 These may be called "the essential attributes of
judicial power" and are generally as follows: (1) the tribunal deals
with a general rather than a specialized area of law; (2) the tribunal's
orders are enforceable without review; (3) the tribunal's orders are
given deference on review; (4) the tribunal's legal rulings are not sub-
ject to de novo review; and (5) the tribunal exercises the powers of a
traditional court. If a tribunal exercises these judicial functions, it de-
parts from the agency model of Crowell.
In Northern Pipeline this inquiry was applied to the question
190. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1985):
"To the extent that [the] structural principle is implicated in a given case, the
parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason
that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter juris-
diction beyond the limitations imposed by Article III, § 2."
191. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
192. The specific factors used by the Court were that: (1) the bankruptcy courts did
not deal with a particularized area of law; (2) orders of the bankruptcy courts
were enforceable without the order of the district court; (3) orders of the bank-
ruptcy court were reviewed under the deferential clearly erroneous standard
rather than the more exacting weight of the evidence standard of Crowell v. Ben-
son; (4) legal rulings of the bankruptcy court were not reviewable under the de
novo standard; (5) the bankruptcy courts exercised all of the power of the district
courts. Id. at 852-53.
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whether the bankruptcy courts were adjuncts of an article IHI court.193
Later cases do not require the tribunal adjudicating common law
rights to be an adjunct, but require only that if a tribunal departs from
the agency model by adjudicating common law claims, the scheme
must retain the essential attributes of judicial power in an article III
court.
The inquiry is functional since it asks whether the regulatory
scheme reallocates judicial power to the agency and would threaten
the tenure protections of article III. Standing alone, the test has
shortcomings: it is not helpful in distinguishing between public and
private rights; nor does it directly further the personal interests or the
fairness value of article III. It only broadly delimits the functions an
article I tribunal may not exercise. It may be too broad, especially in
the case of the last, sweeping category; the powers of a traditional
court apparently include the powers of a federal district court.194 It is
not clear from the cases whether an article I tribunal would be acting
unconstitutionally if it were exercising all of these powers or only a
subset of them.
b. State Law Causes of Action Arising Under Federal Law
The later cases state that the state law nature of a claim adjudi-
cated by an article I tribunal is not determinative, but that special dan-
ger arises when such claims are assigned to non-article III tribunals.95
The threshold inquiry in such cases is whether Congress has with-
drawn the matter from the cognizance of an article III court.
Although the test looks in the first instance at the nature of the claim
rather than the nature of the power the tribunal is exercising, the test
is still explicable in terms of Strauss' quality of relation theory be-
cause it looks pragmatically to Congress' allocation of functions. The
common law action may be a private right that was triable tradition-
ally in an article III court, but the test is whether Congress has with-
drawn the matter from judicial cognizance (i.e., has deprived the
courts of their traditional functions).196 The test assumes that danger
193. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 81 (1982).
194. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986)(Com-
mission did not exercise "all ordinary powers of district courts")(quoting North-
ern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982)).
195. See e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853
(1986)("[Tjhere is no reason inherent in separation of powers principles to accord
the state law character of a claim talismanic power in Article I inquiries.").
196. See supra text accompanying note 128. The functional approach of Schor has
been most recently applied in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), involving
the appointment by the judiciary of an independent counsel to investigate and
prosecute high-ranking officials under the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 591 to 599 (1988). The inquiry was whether the independent counsel violated
the principle of separation-of-powers by interfering with the role of the execu-
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is greatest when the state law claim arises as an initial matter in a
federal regulatory scheme. However, the cases also state that there is
no encroachment when the parties have a choice of fora for the initial
adjudication. Separation-of-powers is violated only when the common
law claim has been entirely withdrawn from article III adjudication
and the parties cannot consent.
Fairness to the litigants is not the primary issue under this test and
its focus is on the structural interests of separations-of-powers. Never-
theless, fairness may be preserved because the regulatory scheme
vests jurisdiction in an article I tribunal only over a small class of spe-
cialized claims. Even this functional inquiry preserves fairness be-
cause determination of a broad area of law is left in the district
court. 1 9 7
c. State Law Caims as a Necessary Incident of the
Congressional Scheme
The inquiry into the necessity of the state law claims to the regula-
tory scheme goes farthest in protecting the fairness of the article I
adjudication. Ex parte Bakelite stated that Congress may provide for
the manner in which congressionally created rights are adjudicated
when the government is a party.198 When the government is not a
tive. Chief Justice Rehnquist found that (1) Congress was not trying to increase
its powers at the expense of the executive; (2) the Act did not work a judicial
usurpation of executive functions; and (3) the act did not "impermissibly under-
mine" the powers of the executive nor prevent it from accomplishing its constitu-
tionally assigned functions. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694-96 (1988) (quoting
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986)).
197. The Schor Court adopted this test from Murray's Lessee. See Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854 (1986)(risk of encroachment greatest
when Congress "'withdraw[s] from judicial cognizance any matter which, from
its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admi-
ralty.' ")(quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272, 284 (1855)). The "withdrawal" test might appear unnecessary
since consent is in any case conditioned on a valid exercise of congressional
power. Therefore, if a litigant may consent to an article I tribunal, afortiori the
scheme has not withdrawn the cause of action from the judiciary. But the with-
drawal test is only one element in a three-part inquiry and a particular scheme
may be valid even in the absence of consent.
Since the Court's concept of consent depends fundamentally on the claim's
occurring as a "necessary incident" of a regulatory scheme Congress may enact,
the concept of consent in the Court's cases appears to have no real value apart
from the separation-of-powers value. The "withdrawal" test may be applied even
where the parties have no choice of fora for initial adjudication as in the case of
putatively public rights, such as those found in Thomas. The argument in the
text states throughout that consent is conditioned on a valid exercise of congres-
sional power. This proposition is not stated as a biconditional since it goes with-
out saying that congressional power does not depend on the litigant's consent.
198. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 450 (1929). Justice Van Devanter upheld
the right of the Patent Office to determine disputes with the following-
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party, the government may exercise sovereign power only if the right
is a necessary incident of a federal scheme Congress may enact.399
The test has two parts, the first of which is whether Congress has a
legitimate power to create the right under article I.
Once it is determined that Congress possesses such power, the next
question is whether the congressional scheme would be possible with-
out the state law claim as an incident. Schor allows a limited class of
cases to be heard by an article I body if such adjudication is a necessary
incident of a congressionally mandated scheme.2 00
The Court's purpose in requiring that the right be necessary is to
prevent Congress from illegitimately usurping the powers of the judi-
ciary, and the Court therefore requires that the private right "arise in
the context of a federal regulatory scheme that virtually occupies the
field."201 In such cases the action of the agency exercising a quasi-
judicial function will be strictly limited by rules of congressional mak-
ing since Congress may determine "the method for the protection of
the 'right' which it created." 20 2 The role of the judiciary in such a
The government cannot be sued, except with its own consent. It can de-
clare in what court it may be sued, and prescribe the forms of pleading
and the rules of practice to be observed in such suits. It may restrict thejurisdiction of the court to consideration of only certain classes of claims
against the United States.
Id. at 453 (quoting McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 426, 440 (1880)).
The Court has noted that the original theory has been eroded by "entitlement"
cases and by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Thomas v. Union Car-
bide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 596 n.1 (1985)(Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment). But the erosion of the traditional theory does not "mandate the con-
clusion that disputes arising in the administration of federal regulatory programs
may not be resolved through Art. I adjudication." Id.
199. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989).
200. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-57 (1986).
201. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,600 (1985)(Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment).
202. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 199 (1958)(Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943)).
It is notable that earlier cases, such as Switchmen's Union, in which the Court
found no right of review of law of a board's decision in a private right case, turn to
common law concepts of the writ of mandamus. The Court in Switchmen's
Union reasoned that Congress intended that there be no review because Con-
gress had committed a purely discretionary act to the administrative board. At
common law the writ of mandamus did not lie to compel discretionary or quasi-
judicial acts. It only lay to compel an administrative body exercising the func-
tions of the executive to perform ministerial acts. Since administrative agencies
perform quasi-judicial acts, the writ of mandamus only "lay to correct violations
of the law committed by officials outside the scope of matters committed to their
discretion." Young, supra note 72, at 803. See also Butte, Anaconda & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 290 U.S. 127, 142 (1933)(opinion by Brandeis, J.); Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. United States ex rel. Arcata & Mad River R.R. C., 65 F.2d
180, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
The Court relied on Switchmen's Union in Thomas to uphold the regulatory
scheme of FIFRA in which, somewhat as under writ practice, the arbitrator's de-
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scheme is not to review application of law to facts, but to review the
agency's regulatory actions to determine that the agency is following
congressional intent.2 03 If Congress has limited the agency's enforce-
ment power to a narrow class of claims, generally the agency cannot
act in an arbitrary manner that would require judicial oversight of
every decision.
If the article I tribunal cannot act arbitrarily, article III's fairness
value is satisfied, and nothing prevents a party from consenting to arti-
cle I adjudication other than article III's structural interests. In Schor
and Granfinanciera the Court stated that consent might play a role in
determining whether a claim is based on a public right. However, con-
sent may play a role only if the state law right is a necessary incident
of the federal regulatory scheme.2 04 The justification for the last as-
sertion must be that in adjudicating a private right an article I tribunal
may refer to state law, but only to determine the federal right. The
parties may consent to such treatment only if they receive the benefits
of the federal scheme; otherwise they should not be subjected to the
loss of private rights. If a party consents, he may lose private rights,
but article III is still satisfied because the claim is not entirely with-
drawn from the cognizance of the article III courts.
Here it may be seen that the two tests work in tandem and the
structural inquiry preserves the fairness value. If the claim is a neces-
sary incident, one may consent; but even if there is no consent, there is
cisions were reviewable only for fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation (ie.,
only when the executive agent exceeded his legitimate discretionary functions).
See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,588 (1985)(plurality
opinion). Cf. Fallon, supra note 109, at 977 n.334 (stating that Switchmen's Union
was "weakly reasoned" and that the Court in Thomas departed from the "pre-
scribed standard").
203. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 601 n.4 (1985)(Bren-
nan, J., concurring in judgment):
The power to interpret federal statutory law could be seen as acting as a
check on the exercise of the executive power-or the power of adminis-
trative agencies whether or not they are considered as under the head of
the executive authority-given that what courts do when they review
agency action, both rulemaking and adjudication, is ensure that the re-
viewed action has not departed from congressional intent.
If this is the case, the minimal requirement of appellate review is satisfied. See
Fallon, supra note 109, at 982 ("[A]t an absolute minimum, article III should be
held to require judicial review in cases in which questions about the proper speci-
fication of general legal norms, rather than just their application, are raised.").
204. That justification might be given as follows: If a state law cause of action arises
under federal law for the sole purpose that rights under federal law may be de-
termined, Congress has created a federal right that may not be determined with-
out the determination of state law rights. Since the federal scheme "occupies the
field," the state law rights may not be adjudicated independently of the federal




still recourse to an article III tribunal if the matter is not entirely
withdrawn from the cognizance of the article III courts.
A further implication may be drawn from the Court's use of all
three tests; so long as the last two test are met (ie., the "withdrawal"
and the "necessary incident" tests), there is no need for adjudication
by an article III tribunal and the appellate role of the judiciary will
satisfy due process; the judiciary is only necessary to ensure that the
article I tribunal is following Congress' intent in its application of state
law. If the two tests are met, appellate review is only required by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.205
Finally, the "necessary incident" inquiry is not merely an ad hoc
balancing approach 20 6 since the Court is constrained to examine
whether the purpose of the congressional scheme can be accomplished
without the state law claim. Thomas demonstrates that the Court re-
quires more than mere inconvenience to the agency; in Thomas the
Court established that the EPA could not conduct the registration un-
less there was a provision for arbitration of the cost of data. The EPA
lacks the expertise to fix the value of such data.207 Case-by-case deter-
mination would not only inconvenience the EPA; it would make the
scheme as conceived impossible. This is not a mere balancing of inter-
ests because the inquiry is to examine whether the intent of Congress
was to bypass the article III courts. Therefore, while Congress may
have an interest in efficient adjudication, this interest would not over-
come the parties' interest in fairness.
In summary, these three tests applied together provide sufficient
protection for the personal interests of article III, while preserving
205. The argument advanced is similar to that spelled out by Justice Brandeis in his
dissent to Crowell v. Benson. There Justice Brandeis stated-
The jurisdiction of [article Il] courts is subject to the control of Con-
gress. Matters which may be placed within their jurisdiction may in-
stead be committed to the state courts. If there be any controversy to
which the judicial power extends that may not be subjected to the con-
clusive determination of administrative bodies or federal legislative
courts, it is not because of any prohibition against the diminution of the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts as such, but because, under cer-
tain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a re-
quirement of judicial process.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 86-87 (1932). See also Palmore v. United States,
411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973). But cf. Fallon, supra note 109, at 939-40.
206. Contra Fallon, supra note 109, at 917: "[IThe Court now has endorsed an ad hoc
balancing test that is almost wholly open-ended and amorphous." See also id. at
932 & n.114.
207. The Court noted: "Congress viewed data-sharing as essential to the registration
scheme, but concluded EPA must be relieved of the task of valuation because
disputes regarding the compensation scheme had 'for all practical purposes, tied
up their registration process' and '[EPA] lacked the expertise necessary to estab-
lish the proper amount of compensation."' Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric'l
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 573 (1985)(quoting 123 CONG. REc. 25,709 (1977)).
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flexibility for Congress to act. The tests insure that the agency will
not apply state law, which is reserved for the article III courts, because
the private right arises only in the regulatory scheme. Furthermore,
fairness to the litigants is preserved if they enter the scheme volunta-
rily by accepting its benefits.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
This Part applies the foregoing analysis to the bankruptcy courts.
The Court is reluctant to say that restructuring of debtor-creditor re-
lations is a public right,208 although it continues to apply the distinc-
tion of public and private rights to the bankruptcy courts. According
to Granfinanciera, by consent a creditor's claim may arise "as part of
the process of allowance and disallowance of claims."20 9 Consent,
therefore, only brings the claim into the possession of the bankruptcy
court where the seventh amendment right to trial by jury may be lost.
Nevertheless, Granfinanciera is consistent with the proposition that a
right to recovery in bankruptcy may be a public right because it is a
necessary incident of a congressionally mandated scheme.2 10
This Part considers proceedings Congress categorized as core at 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). It is generally recognized that listing of a proceed-
ing in section 157(b)(2) is not conclusive concerning the core status of
the proceeding21 ' and that the inquiry into the core status of the pro-
ceeding is whether it may be constitutionally heard by a bankruptcy
court.2 12
A. Turnover Proceedings
Section 157(b)(2)(E) provides that proceedings for the turnover of
estate property are core.21 3 In turnover proceedings the estate sues
under 11 U.S.C. § 542 to recover property of the estate from third par-
ties. These proceedings usually involve initial determination of own-
ership of property under state law.2 1 4 If the analysis suggested above
208. See Gibson, supra note 14, at 169.
209. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 58 (1989).
210. Id. at 54. As Gibson notes, the Court has said that the private right must be inte-
grated into a "public regulatory scheme" and the bankruptcy laws do not consti-
tute a regulatory scheme. Gibson, supra note 14, at 170-71. Nevertheless, Gibson
asserts that the bankruptcy laws may not violate the separation-of-powers doc-
trine. Id. at 171-72.
211. See Piombo Corp. v. Castlerock Properties (In re Castlerock Properties), 781 F.2d
159, 162 (9th Cir. 1986).
212. Id.
213. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E)(1988).
214. The National Bankruptcy Conference took the position that turnover proceed-
ings, especially actions to collect prepetition account receivables, were not core
because of their similarity to the state law contract dispute in Northern Pipeline.
See Greenfield, The National Bankruptcy Conference's Position on the Court Sys-
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is correct, the constitutional question concerning core status should be
whether the state law claim may be treated as a public right.
Bayless v. Crabtree Through Adams21 5 presents an interesting dis-
cussion of the constitutionality of the use of state law in a turnover
proceeding. It is also a good illustration of how application of
Granflinanciera's formalism may result in unfairness to defendants.
The case is unusual because, although most of the cases on section 542
consider the constitutionality of actions to recover accounts receivable
under section 542(b), Bayless v. Crabtree concerned the constitutional-
ity of an action to recover tangible property under section 542(a).
In Bayless v. Crabtree the trustee in a chapter 11 case, Bayless,
sought an injunction ordering turnover of property conveyed to the
debtors' children. Specifically, debtors had purported to convey pro-
perty in Rhode Island and Oklahoma City to the Crabtree children.
The trustee attacked these inter vivos gifts as invalid under state law
and sought turnover of the property. On appeal to the district court
the Crabtree children challenged the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court to adjudicate the validity of the gifts because (1) the jurisdic-
tional provisions of BAFJA were unconstitutional and (2) the turno-
ver proceeding was noncore because resolution of ownership hinged
solely on state law.
The district court addressed the constitutional challenge by noting
that the key element in determining constitutionality post-Northern
Pipeline is not the state law character of the right, but rather (1) the
relation of the proceeding to the "basic function of the bankruptcy
court" and (2) the congressional intent in using state law in turnover
proceedings under section 542.216 The district court held that turn-
over proceedings are core because of their importance to administra-
tion of the estate.2 1 7
The district court's analysis of the constitutional challenge cor-
rectly recognized the structural interest protected by article III. The
court might have used the words of Schor to say that Congress' intent
was clearly not to aggrandize itself by withdrawing an action based on
state law from the courts, but to expedite administration of the bank-
ruptcy estate.2 18
However, the court in Bayless v. Crabtree failed to apply the cor-
rect analysis to the challenge of the turnover proceeding as noncore.
tern Under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, and
Suggestions for Rules Promulgation, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 357, 365 (1986).
215. 108 Bankr. 299 (W.D. Okla. 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1991).
216. Id. at 302 n.1 (quoting Arnold Print Works, Inc. v. Apkin (In re Arnold Print
Works, Inc.), 815 F.2d 165, 169 (1st Cir. 1987)).
217. Id. at 304 (citing In re Jacobs, 48 Bankr. 570 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985)).
218. See also In re Lion Capital Group, 46 Bankr. 850 (Bankr. 1985)(analyzing constitu-




The court should have employed the public-private right distinction to
this issue instead of basing its decision solely on the importance of the
action for administration of the estate. More specifically, the court
failed to ask whether the defendants had consented to adjudication by
an article I tribunal. The court did consider the issue of consent in its
denial of the Crabtree children's request for a jury trial, as required by
Granfinanciera.2 1 9 Nevertheless, the court improperly denied the
Crabtree children access to state court since the court wrongly charac-
terized them as consenting merely because they filed counterclaims
against the estate. In this case the turnover proceeding was at most a
related proceeding.
One might argue that the scheme of section 542 itself impermissi-
bly removes initial adjudication of ownership issues from state
court.220 Under the practice of the 1898 Act turnover proceedings
could be entertained in bankruptcy court only over property in the
actual or constructive possession of the bankruptcy court.221 Section
1334(d) of the 1984 amendments gives the district court exclusive ju-
risdiction over "all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as
of the commencement of [the] case, and of the estate."2 22 BAFJA,
therefore, grants much broader jurisdiction than that under the 1898
Act. However, since the bankruptcy courts are adjuncts, state law
claims are not withdrawn entirely from the cognizance of the article
III courts and the question under the 1984 amendments accordingly
ought to be whether the bankruptcy court has related or core jurisdic-
tion over a turnover proceeding. Unless the defendant has consented
to jurisdiction by filing a proof of claim against the estate or is sched-
uled as a creditor, the claim is at most a related proceeding since it is
not integral to the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations. This is
the second thread in the Granfinanciera standard for core
treatment.223
The fact that the defendants filed counterclaims against the estate
219. Bayless v. Crabtree Through Adams, 108 Bankr. 299, 304-05 (W.D. Okla. 1989),
qff'd, 930 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1991). Id. at 304-05. The court's analysis of the issue
of consent is in any case flawed. The court asserted that the children's counter-
claim in the turnover proceeding was equivalent to a proof of claim. Id. at 305.
220. See Ferriell, Core Proceedings in Bankruptcy Court, 56 UMKC L. REV. 47, 81-91
(1987).
221. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2a(7), 30 Stat. 544, 546 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § lla(7)(1976)(repealed 1978)), reprinted in 1 app. COLLIER 15th ed.,
supra note 16, at 7. The Supreme Court has held that in a chapter 11 case the
bankruptcy court has broad jurisdiction over turnover proceedings. See United
States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d)(1988).
223. See supra note 138. See also Gibson, supra note 14, at 168 (when "a fraudulent
conveyance action involves only private rights-at least when the defendant has
not filed a claim against the estate-according to Granfinanciera Congress may
not assign its adjudication to the non-article III bankruptcy court").
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in Bayless v. Crabtree was not enough to give the bankruptcy court
jurisdiction.224 The defendants' counterclaims apparently came only
after the trustee had named them as defendants in the turnover pro-
ceeding.22 5 Had they been scheduled as creditors of the estate or had
they actually filed claims against the estate, they would have been
subject to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to determine debtor-
creditor relations.226 The claim against them would have then been
core. As it was, the claims against the defendants in Bayless v. Crab-
tree were at most related proceedings, 227 and the district court should
have abstained.
The analysis suggested for Bayless v. Crabtree, which involved tan-
gible property, can be applied to actions to recover intangible property
based on prepetition contract claims under section 542(b), although
the courts have used a different analysis.2 28 The caselaw on this issue
is much more developed and in general is based on the distinction be-
tween summary and plenary jurisdiction (ie., constructive possession
of property). If the defendant contests the prepetition contract, the
court lacks constructive possession and the proceeding is related.2 29 If
224. Reasoning similar to that criticized in the text was employed in In re National
Equip. & Mold Corp., 60 Bankr. 133,136 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986)(counterclaim to
turnover proceeding based on defendant's setoff rights core as proceeding to al-
low or disallow claim under section 157(b)(2)(B)). The court in National Equip-
ment & Mold cited no authority for its reasoning.
225. The district court's opinion does not indicate the exact procedural sequence.
226. See Piombo Corp. v. Castlerock Properties (In re Castlerock Properties), 781 F.2d
159,162 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Marine Iron & Shipbuilding Co., 104 Bankr. 976 (D.
Minn. 1989). In Castlerock the court held that consent of the defendant was in-
sufficient to make the state law contract action a core proceeding when the de-
fendant filed a claim against the estate only after the debtor had filed suit. See
also In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., 58 Bankr. 838 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986)(no
consent inferrable from defendant's filing of compulsory counterclaim in debtor
in possession's action on accounts receivable); Hughes-Bechtol, Inc. v. Air Enters.
(In re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc.), 107 Bankr. 552 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989)(court did
not base its conclusion on consent but rather on whether the claim would deter-
mine the pro rata distribution among the different classes of defendants).
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)(1988). Collier on Bankruptcy states that turnover pro-
ceedings may be claims that are neither related nor arise under title 11, but
rather may be within the residual category of claims that arise in title 11. 1 COL.
LIER 15th ed., supra note 16,1 3.01[1][c][v], at 3-29. If the analysis suggested in the
text is correct, turnover proceedings arise in a title 11 case only when the defend-
ant has consented to bankruptcy jurisdiction. Absent consent, the proceeding is
related. This assumes that the distinction between proceedings arising in and re-
lated to the title 11 case should be analyzed in terms of whether a proceeding may
constitutionally be heard by a bankruptcy judge. See Norton & Lieb, supra note
99, at 58-59.
228. See Note, Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Court in Accounts Receivable Actions, 4
BANcIR DEv. J. 239 (1987).
229. See, eg., In re Satelco, 58 Bankr. 781, 786 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); In re World
Fin. Servs. Center, 64 Bankr. 980, 986-87 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986); In re Maislin
Indus., U.S., 50 Bankr. 943, 950 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); Acolyte Elec. Corp. v.
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the claim has matured or is liquidated so that the defendant cannot
contest the contract claim, the action arises in the title 11 case and the
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over the proceeding as core.2 30
However, if there is no bona fide dispute and the property is in the
constructive possession of the bankruptcy court, then there is implied
consent.2 31
B. In re Ben Cooper, Inc.
The issue of jury trials in the bankruptcy courts, a possibility left
open by Granfinanciera, has caused a conflict among the lower courts.
Jury trials in bankruptcy court were originally provided for by 28
U.S.C. § 1480, enacted as part of the 1978 Reform Act.232 Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 9015 provided procedures for jury trials in
bankruptcy courts where the right to such trials existed under section
1480.233
In the wake of Northern Pipeline jury trials in bankruptcy court
were prohibited by the Emergency Rule and BAFJA has been found
to contain the same prohibition. Section 113 of the 1984 amendments
provided that 28 U.S.C. § 1480 would not become effective. 2 4 BAFJA
City of New York, 69 Bankr. 155, 170-72 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Century
Brass Prods., 58 Bankr. 838, 840-44 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986).
230. See, e.g., In re Allegheny, Inc., 68 Bankr. 183, 190 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986); In re
Baldwin-United Corp., 48 Bankr. 49, 53 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
231. Acolyte Elec. Corp. v. City of New York, 69 Bankr. 155, 171 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1986); In re Century Brass Prods., 58 Bankr. 838, 844 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986).
232. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2671 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1480(a) (repealed 1984)), provided:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and title
11 do not affect any right to trial by jury, in a case under title 11 or in a
proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under
title 11, that is provided by any statute in effect on September 30, 1979.
233. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9015, 461 U.S. 973, 1078-79 (1982)(abrogated 1987).
234. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 113, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 343.
Among the oddities of the 1984 amendments was the inconsistency between
sections 113 and 121 of the Act. Section 121 of BAFJA provided that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1480 would become effective. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 121(a), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 345. This inconsistency was further exacerbated by an inter-
view of Senators Dole and DeConcini published in the American Bankruptcy In-
stitute Newsletter in which Senator DeConcini stated that the 1984 amendments
were not intended to alter the jury trial rights under the 1978 Reform Act. See
Dole/DeConcini Interviewed, AM. BANKR. INST. NEWSL., Winter 1984-85, at 3:
The change in statutory language came about as a result of com-
promises that the conferees settle [sic] upon in resolving the issue of ab-
stention in personal injury and wrongful death cases.... The conferees
agreed upon the importance of safeguarding this right to jury trial if it
existed under applicable non-bankruptcy law. The language of Section
1411(a) as it now reads was crafted with that end in mind. However, the
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replaced section 1480 with 28 U.S.C. § 1411 which preserves the right
to a jury trial only in personal injury and wrongful death tort cases.23 5
In 1987 the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial
Conference abrogated Rule 9015 in reaction to Congress' replacement
of section 1480 by section 1411.236
The courts of appeals are now split on the issue of jury trials in
bankruptcy court.23 7 The most compelling opinion in favor of jury tri-
als is Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Ben Cooper, Inc. (In re Ben
Cooper, Inc.).23 8 In this case the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a bankruptcy court may conduct jury trials if a proceeding is
legal-rather than equitable--and within the core jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts.
In Ben Cooper the debtor, Ben Cooper, Inc. (Cooper), had filed a
plan in a chapter 11 reorganization in which Cooper covenanted that it
would adequately insure its commercial property against casualty. It
obtained insurance through two insurance brokers from the Insurance
Company of the State of Pennsylvania (ICSP).
One of Cooper's facilities was involved in a fire, and ICSP dis-
claimed liability on the grounds of misrepresentation in Cooper's pol-
icy of insurance. ICSP claimed that Cooper listed the insured
property as a warehouse when in fact it was used as a manufacturing
plant.
ICSP cancelled its policy with Cooper and brought suit in state
court for rescission of its contract with Cooper. Cooper sought and
conferees simply inadvertently failed to pick up the broader language of
the former provision. There was no desire on the part of any of the con-
ferees to limit the right to jury trial in other areas.
For the effect of this interview, see Lerblance v. Rogers (In re Rogers & Sons), 48
Bankr. 683, 686-87 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1985). See also In re Tripplett, 115 Bankr.
955, 959 n.6 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990)(relying on omission of other jury trial rights
from bill making technical corrections to BAFJA).
235. The 1984 amendments are discussed in Gibson, Jury Trials and Bankruptcy:
Obeying the Commands of Article III and the Seventh Amendment, 72 MINN. L.
REv. 967 (1988); Comment, The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984: The Impact on the Right of Jury Trial in Bankruptcy Court, 16 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 535 (1985).
236. FED. R. BANKR P. 9015 advisory note (1987).
237. The Second and Ninth Circuits have come down in favor of jury trials in bank-
ruptcy court. See Insurance Co. of Pa. v. Ben Cooper, Inc. (In re Ben Cooper,
Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991); Taxel v.
Electronic Sports Research (In re Cinematronics, Inc.), 916 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th
Cir. 1990)(bankruptcy judges may hold jury trials in core proceedings). The
Eighth and Tenth Circuits have come down against them. See In re United Mo.
Bank of Kansas City, 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990)(deciding issue as matter of
statutory construction and failing to reach the constitutional question); Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990)(fol-
lowing Eighth Circuit's reasoning).
238. 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir.), cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269, vacated, 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990),
on remand, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
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obtained a stay of the state court litigation from the bankruptcy court.
Cooper then commenced an adversary proceeding against ICSP in
bankruptcy court for a declaration of liability under state contract law
and for punitive damages. The insurance brokers were joined as de-
fendants in the suit on grounds of malpractice.
The defendants appealed to the district court to withdraw its refer-
ence to the bankruptcy court and to lift the stay on the state court
litigation. The district court eventually abstained and lifted the stay.
Cooper then appealed to the Second Circuit.
A panel of the Second Circuit reversed the district court. The
court's holding was in three parts: (1) a postpetition contract claim is
core; (2) the parties were entitled to a jury trial of the matter in the
bankruptcy court; and (3) jury trials in bankruptcy court do not vio-
late article III. In light of the discussion in the preceding sections, the
Second Circuit's analysis in reaching these conclusions is inadequate.
1. Postpetition Contracts
First, the court concluded that a proceeding based on a contract
entered into after the filing of the bankruptcy petition is core, basing
its analysis on 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). That section states that "mat-
ters concerning administration of the estate" are core.23 9 The court's
239. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)(2)(A)(1988). Courts have divided over how broadly subsection
(A) is to be applied. Some courts have used subsection (A) to declare actions
arising postpetition to be core. E.g., In re Balboa Improvements, Ltd., 99 Bankr.
966 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (suit for maladministration of bankruptcy estate core to
extent of determination of attorneys' fees, but related to extent it deals with dam-
ages under state law); Valley Forge Plaza Assocs. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 107
Bankr. 514 (E.D. Pa. 1989)(action against insurance company for cancellation of
policy core proceeding since preservation of insurance contract is crucial to ad-
ministration of estate); In re Levine, 100 Bankr. 537 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989)(ac-
tions premised on debtor's postpetition misconduct core proceedings); In re
Sarasota Casual, Inc., 90 Bankr. 496 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988)(breach of postpeti-
tion contract); In re Sonyco Coal, 89 Bankr. 658 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio); In re Will
Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc., 111 Bankr. 948 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990)(viola-
tion of antidiscrimination provision by denial of license to race track owner is
core proceeding); In re Railroad Dynamics, 97 Bankr. 239 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1989)(action against trust company for failure to sell declining stocks owned
postpetition by debtor is core proceeding); In re Texas Sheet Metals, 90 Bankr.
260 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988)(rejection of collective bargaining agreement).
Other courts have held that the mere fact that a cause of action arises during
administration of the estate does not make that cause of action a core proceeding.
Piombo Corp. v. Castlerock Properties (In re Castlerock Properties), 781 F.2d 159,
162 (9th Cir. 1986)(state law contract claims not specifically listed in section
157(b)(2)(B) to (N) noncore even if they arguably fall within subsections (A) and
(0)); In re Marine Iron & Shipbuilding Co., 104 Bankr. 976 (D. Minn. 1989)(non-
transactional claim by debtor against party who had not filed a claim against es-
tate held noncore but bankruptcy court could hear it as related proceeding). But
cf. Hughes-Bechtol, Inc. v. Air Enters. (In re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc.), 107 Bankr.
552 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989)(state law claim by debtor against two creditors core
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reasoning was based on two premises: the petition "adjusts the rights
of others connected with the proceeding";240 further, the contract of
insurance was necessary for administration of the bankruptcy estate
because it protected assets of the estate, it was required by the bank-
ruptcy plan, and it was issued by an insurance company that knew it
was dealing with a debtor-in-possession. 241
The court rejected a better line of authority that asserts that a
postpetition claim must be brought against a creditor who has filed a
claim in the bankruptcy proceeding (i.e., must be "transactional") to
be necessary to the administration of the estate and core under section
157(b)(2)(A).2 This approach is consistent with the requirement
under the caselaw that the state law claim be a necessary incident of a
congressionally mandated scheme. Since a private right may become a
public right when a party consents to adjudication in an article I tribu-
nal, a postpetition claim is' core under section 157(b)(2)(A) only when
the defendant has consented to suit in bankruptcy court. A third-
party defendant who was not scheduled as a creditor or claimant of
the estate but who has been haled into bankruptcy court by the es-
tate's trustee cannot be said to have consented to the court's jurisdic-
tion.243 Absent consent, the private right at issue in Ben Cooper was
not a necessary incident of the legislative scheme since the action
under state contract law was not necessary to determine rights under
federal law.
The weakness in the court's reasoning can be discerned in its con-
under subsection (A) because it would establish setoff, subrogation and lien
rights, issues that resemble creditors' hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata
share of the bankruptcy res).
240. Insurance Co. of Pa. v. Ben Cooper, Inc. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394,
1399 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting 4 CoLmER 15th ed., supra note 16, 541.04, at 541-22),
cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
241. Id.
242. For cases requiring that the postpetition claim be transactional, see Piombo Corp.
v. Castlerock Properties (In re Castlerock Properties), 781 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir.
1986); In re Marine Iron & Shipbuilding Co., 104 Bankr. 976 (D. Minn. 1989). In
Castlerock the court held that consent of the defendant was insufficient to make
the state law contract action a core proceeding when the defendant filed a claim
against the estate only after the debtor had filed suit against the defendant.
Hughes-Bechtol, Inc. v. Air Enters. (In re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc.), 107 Bankr. 552
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989), is also illustrative. In that case the defendants in the
state law contract action had filed claims against the estate. The court did not
base its conclusion on consent but on whether the claim would determine the pro
rata distribution among the different classes of defendants.
Analytically, Castlerock and Hughes-Bechtol are not inconsistent with the the-
sis advanced here. Both require the claim to be necessary to administration of the
estate and cloak this requirement in terms of consent to the federal scheme of
adjusting debtor-creditor relations.
243. At most a claim for a contract entered into postpetition without the defendant's
consent is a related proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). For a discussion of
section 1334, see supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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clusion that since the state law claim in Northern Pipeline concerned
a contract entered into prepetition, a contract entered into postpeti-
tion is immune from attack under article 111.244 Merely applying a
temporal test is insufficient since the Supreme Court has not entirely
abandoned the public rights analysis. The court in Ben Cooper, how-
ever, does apply this analysis when it raises the seventh amendment
issue.
2. Jury Trials in Bankruptcy Court
When the court in Ben Cooper applied the public rights analysis
from Granfinanciera to the issue of jury trials in bankruptcy court, it
made a simple mistake of logic. The court interpreted Granfinanciera
to mean that core proceedings that are legal rather than equitable in
nature must be tried before a jury. It then improperly concluded that
the bankruptcy court had the authority to conduct jury trials in pro-
ceedings that are core and legal. The court's syllogism is "faulty" in
that it inferred the authority from the right.245
But there is a more fundamental mistake underlying the fallacy.
The court's conclusion is based on the assumption that merely because
a claim is core and legal it is entitled to a jury trial. However, the
analysis in Granfinanciera has two prongs: first, it asks whether the
claim was a legal claim at the time the seventh amendment was rati-
fied; it then asks whether it is a public right Congress has assigned and
may assign to an article I tribunal.246
The court in Ben Cooper neglected the second step in the
Gran.financiera analysis. The second step is a key element of the
analysis because, if a court determines that a right is legal rather than
equitable in nature, it may then determine that the claim is neverthe-
less a public right and therefore triable in a tribunal that lacks the
essential elements of judicial power.247 The Ben Cooper court as-
244. "We read Marathon to apply to claims arising pre-petition, and decline to apply
that ruling to claims involving contracts entered into post-petition." Insurance
Co. of Pa. v. Ben Cooper, Inc. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394, 1400 (2d Cir.
1990)(emphasis in original), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
245. See In re United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, 901 F.2d 1449, 1456 (8th Cir. 1990).
Contra Gibson, supra note 13,157-63)(disapproving the Eighth Circuit's conserva-
tive approach).
246. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42, 53-54 (1989). See also supra note
138; Gibson, supra note 14, at 165-66.
247. The Ben Cooper court's confusion is evident from the following-
If, therefore, the Supreme Court held that all adversary proceedings
sounding in law are private rights of action, a determination that the
instant action is legal would compel us to hold that the proceeding is not
core.
Fortunately, we need not read Granfinanciera so broadly. That opin-
ion also contains several passages indicating the Court's contemplation
that its holding may result in jury trials in the bankruptcy court.
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sumed that because the claim was legal, the parties were entitled to a
jury trial; it also assumed that if a claim is core under section 157(b), a
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over it under 28 U.S.C. § 151.248
The court concluded that the proceeding was core. Granted that
the court's construction of the statutes is possible, still the court
should have reasoned that core proceedings are matters of public-
rather than private-right. Granfinanciera stated that a public right
may be tried without a jury because a public right may be tried in an
article I court. Therefore the second step of the inquiry in
Granfinanciera is to determine whether Congress may assign the
legal right to a non-article III tribunal that does not use a jury as a
fact-finder. However, the court failed to apply an inquiry into the
public right status of the core proceeding.
3. Article III and Jury Trials in Article I Tribunals
The court concluded that article III imposes no constitutional bar-
rier to jury trials in bankruptcy courts. But the court's analysis did
not address the inquiry mandated by Schor and Thomas.249 To apply
this analysis requires an inquiry into whether the scheme protects the
personal and structural interests of article III.
The inquiry into whether personal interests are protected involves
the issue of consent: has the defendant consented to adjudication of
the private right in an article I tribunal? If not, then the matter must
Insurance Co. of Pa. v. Ben Cooper, Inc. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394,
1401 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991). The court in Ben Cooper
correctly points out that the Granfinanciera Court never equates the category of
core proceedings with the equitable, summary jurisdiction under the 1898 Act.
However, the court in Ben Cooper can produce only passages from the dissent to
support quoted assertion concerning jury trials. It does not address the rationale
in Granfinanciera, which, as noted above, was based on Crowell. See supra notes
142-43 and accompanying text.
248. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)(stating that the bankruptcy judges "may exercise the au-
thority conferred under this chapter with respect to any action, suit or
proceeding").
249. The court based its decision on the assumption that the scheme of section 157 was
constitutional: "The essential predicate question, even more fundamental [than
the jury issue], is whether the statutory authority of the bankruptcy judges to
enter final judgments in core proceedings runs afoul of Article III." Insurance
Co. of Pa. v. Ben Cooper, Inc. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394,1403 (2d Cir.
1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991). By assuming that the statutory scheme
of section 157 did not violate article III, it was inevitable that the court would
conclude: "If bankruptcy courts have the power to enter fimal judgments without
violating Article III, it follows that jury verdicts in bankruptcy courts do not vio-
late Article III." Id. The conclusion, even though warranted, bypasses the analy-
sis necessary to solve the constitutional question. The court therefore did not
consider that the Supreme Court's analysis is functional: the nature of the claim
that may legitimately be adjudicated is closely connected with the functions the
tribunal may validly exercise.
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be adjudicated in an article III, or state, court. Even if the parties con-
sent to jury trial in bankruptcy court, such practice may still be uncon-
stitutional as violating the separation-of-powers values of article III.
The inquiry into the structural interests asks (1) whether the es-
sential attributes of judicial power are retained in an article III court;
(2) whether Congress has withdrawn the matter from the cognizance
of the courts; and (3) whether the private right is a necessary incident
of the congressional scheme (i.e., whether the scheme would be possi-
ble without the private right as an incident).
Arguably, the practice of jury trials in the bankruptcy courts
would violate each of these structural tests. Trial by jury is quintes-
sentially a traditional attribute of judicial power.250 The cases allow
United States magistrates and the judges of the courts of the District
of Columbia to conduct jury trials in article I tribunals,251 but these
courts may be distinguished from the bankruptcy courts.25 2 Specifi-
cally, in the case of the United States magistrates, Congress has en-
acted legislation allowing full-time magistrates to conduct jury trials
with the consent of the parties.2 5 3 Significantly, Congress has acqui-
esced to abrogation of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9015
which governed jury trials under the 1978 Act. Furthermore, 28
U.S.C. § 1411, which is the only statute to address jury trials in related
proceedings, provides only for jury trials in cases of personal injury or
wrongful death tort claims, which must be tried in district court.25
Functionally, allowing jury trials in related proceedings would
250. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986)(point-
ing with favor to the fact that the Commission "unlike the bankruptcy courts
under the 1978 Act, does not exercise 'all ordinary powers of district courts,' and
thus may not, for instance, preside over jury trials")(quoting Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982)). See also Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 61 (1932)("In a trial by jury in a Federal court the judge is
'not a mere moderator' but 'is the governor of the trial' for the purpose of assur-
ing its proper conduct as well as of determining questions of law.")(quoting Her-
ron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 95 (1931)). Cf. text accompanying note 194.
251. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974)(District of Columbia judges);
Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.)(federal magistrates), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 870 (1984).
252. In Pernell the jury trial was necessary because the Courts of the District of Co-
lumbia are equivalent to state courts (i.e., are courts of general jurisdiction). See
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974). See also Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); American Home Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511
(1828). In Collins the jury trial conducted by the United States magistrate was
not being attacked under the seventh amendment and the issue was never raised.
Cf. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989)(magistrate may not preside at jury
selection in federal trial without defendant's consent). See also Sabino, Jury Tri-
als, Bankruptcy Judges, and Article III: The Constitutional Crisis of the Bank-
ruptcy Court, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 258, 310-12 (1991).
253. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)(1988).
254. 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988). Section 1411(a) provides: "Except as provided in subsec-
tion (b) of this section, this chapter and title 11 do not affect any right to trial by
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"withdraw the matter from the cognizance" of an article III court.
The court in Hughes-Bechtol, Inc. v. Air Enterprises (In re Hughes-
Bechto4 Inc.)255 has reached a similar conclusion on the basis of the
seventh amendment which provides that "no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law."2-% The quoted language pre-
vents a subsequent jury trial on any issue already tried to a jury.
However, if a bankruptcy court conducted a jury trial in a related pro-
ceeding without consent of the parties, it would be required to submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court.257
If the district court is prevented by the seventh amendment from con-
ducting a jury trial in its de novo review of the bankruptcy proceeding
under section 157(c)(1), it will not be able to perform its article III
functions.258
Moreover, even with consent of the parties, jury trials in bank-
ruptcy courts of core proceedings based on private rights would violate
the structural interests protected by article III. Allowing full jury tri-
als of private rights in bankruptcy courts would deprive the private
litigants of initial adjudication before a court with the protections of
article III. Under the caselaw the congressional scheme must not
withdraw a claim from the cognizance of the article III courts. How-
ever, on the reasoning of Ben Cooper, the issues tried to a jury might
be withdrawn since initial adjudication in bankruptcy court would be
allowed whenever a claim is both core and legal.
Finally, jury trials are not a necessary incident of the legislative
scheme created by BAFJA.259 In fact, Congress appears to have pur-
posely omitted jury trials, following the example of the Judicial Con-
ference in promulgating the Emergency Rule.260 The legislative
jury that an individual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a
personal injury or wrongful death tort claim."
255. 107 Bankr. 552 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
256. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
257. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)(1988). Of course the bankruptcy court may enter final
judgment in such related proceedings with the consent of the parties. See id.
§ 157(c)(2).
258. See Hughes-Bechtol, Inc. v. Air Enters. (In re Hughes-Bechtol, Inc.), 107 Bankr.
552, 571 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989). See also Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434 (3d
Cir. 1990)(seventh amendment not compatible with present statutory require-
ment of review de novo in noncore proceedings); Cyr, The Right to Trial by Jury
in Bankruptcy: Which Judge Is to Preside?, 63 Am. BANKI L.J. 53, 61
(1989)(same).
259. See In re United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, 901 F.2d 1449, 1456 (8th Cir.
1990)(power to conduct jury trials not indispensable power to carry out the au-
thority granted by section 157).
260. See 130 CONG. REC. H6242 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984), where Representative Kind-
ness stated that his amendment to create non-article HI bankruptcy judges was
"essentially a legislative enactment of the emergency bankruptcy rule, the model
rule that has been in effect, under which the bankruptcy courts have been operat-
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scheme of BAFJA would be possible even without jury trials since, on
a proper application of the analysis in Granfinanciera, only noncore,
private right claims are entitled to jury trials.
VI. CONCLUSION
The analysis presented in the preceding Part may be applied to
other issues arising under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). Such analysis is beyond
the scope of the present study,261 butwould be similar to that set forth
above. Accordingly, inquiry into both the personal and structural in-
terests of article III is required.
This Comment has argued that the concept of consent plays a sig-
nificant role in the analysis of bankruptcy jurisdiction since a defend-
ant is brought into the process of "allowance and disallowance of
claims" either by being scheduled as a creditor of-or by filing a claim
against-the bankruptcy estate. Depending on the nature of the pro-
ceeding, the creditor's claim may then become subject to the equitable
power of the bankruptcy court and the creditor's privileges under
state law may be lost.262
However, when a case involves a third-party defendant who has
not consented to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,
the courts should not treat the state law claim as lost. The significant
constitutional question is not whether a particular type of claim enu-
merated under section 157(b) is core, but whether a party has become
subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.26 3 A creditor may
become subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in two
ways: by being scheduled as a creditor of the estate or by filing a claim
against the estate. When a party is not an estate claimant, but has a
claim based on rights independent of the pro rata distribution of estate
proceeds, estate administration would not be impeded by treating the
party's claim as related rather than core. Such treatment preserves
the party's right to object to the court's jurisdiction over the proceed-
ing and preserves the constitutionality of the bankruptcy proceeding.
It bears repeating that courts should inquire into the party's con-
sent. Consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court will not nec-
essarily make a dispute core but, as long as recourse to a state court or
ing." See also Emergency Rule § (d)(1)(D), reprinted in 1 COLLIER 15th ed.,
supra note 16, 3.01[1l[b][vi, at 3-16 to -17 (prohibiting bankruptcy judges from
conducting jury trials).
261. It has been attempted by Ferriell, supra note 13, at 134-60. Ferriell's approach
may be faulted because of his reliance on state law in a manner reminiscent of
Northern Pipeline; to some extent this is due to the fact that his article antedates
Granfinanciera.
262. This is consistent with the Court's subsequent application of Granfinanciera in
Langencamp v. Culp, 111 S. Ct. 330, 331 (1990)(per curiam).
263. See Gibson, supra note 14, at 168-69.
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district court is available, consent will bring the claim into the restruc-
turing of debtor-creditor relations. As was stated above, the adversary
proceeding in Ben Cooper was at most a related proceeding com-
menced in state court as an action for rescission of an insurance con-
tract. Although the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to hear
this state court action, the congressional scheme was not invalid be-
cause an alternative forum was available. If the Ben Cooper court had
employed the analysis suggested here, it might have simply held that
the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the related proceeding.
This would have avoided the need for the seventh amendment
inquiry.264
This Comment has suggested that many jurisdictional issues
presented before bankruptcy courts may be solved by analysis of the
policies underlying article III. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has
not been consistent in its application of article III to the bankruptcy
courts. However, the Court has developed a test that, though prag-
matic, is consistent with general principles of article III. If the courts
adhere to the underlying constitutional principles, the application of
the Court's analysis will seldom be doubtful and will preserve the val-
ues of article III.
Jeffrey H. Bush '91*
264. Before denying certiorari in Ben Cooper, the Supreme Court vacated the Second
Circuit's judgment and remanded for a reconsideration of the Second Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction. Insurance Co. of Pa. v. Ben Cooper, Inc. (In re Ben Cooper,
Inc.), 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990). On remand a three judge panel of the Second Circuit
reinstated its previous judgment. It held that the district court's withdrawal of its
reference from the bankruptcy court and abstention from asserting its jurisdic-
tion constituted an appealable final order. Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of
Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 924 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1991). The district court's
order was oral and did not indicate its grounds for abstention. If on remand the
Second Circuit had found that the district court's abstention was mandatory
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)(2)(West Supp. 1991), then the order would have been
unappealable. However, the Second Circuit found that the district court's absten-
tion was permissive under section 1334(c)(1), which allows appeal of the
determination.
* The author thanks Professor Richard Harnsberger and Patricia Miklos for their
helpful comments on n earlier draft. The assistance of Mark Fahleson is also
gratefully acknowledged.
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